The (Secondary) Virtuality of Rhetorical Truth

Don Kunze • Penn State University

Figure 1. The detective Dupin takes the purloined letter from the card-rack while the Minister M_ is distracted by a commotion in the street. The story, like Lacan's teaching, pivots around the idea of style: one player's judgment of the opponents intelligence (Morra) determines the outcome, the choice of the "odd" option, the one that remains after other alternatives have been paired and eliminated from inquiry. This is the virtual secondary of Poe's "The Purloined Letter."

[T]he invisible is no more a function of a subject's sighting than is the visible: the invisible is the theoretical problematic's non-vision of its non-objects, the invisible is the darkness, the blinded eye of the theoretical problematic's self-reflection when it scans its non-objects, its non-problems without seeing them, in order not to look at them. —Louis Althusser, *Reading Capital*, 1968.

In a podcast of 2003, Slavoj Žižek made a strong case that, in opposition to the "virtual reality" that pictorially grounds the everyday life as a framed scene easily simulated by computer graphics, there was a "reality *of* the virtual" that, from behind the scenes, constituted an efficient cause in each of the three Lacanian domains, the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary.[1] This palindromic secondary virtuality was both interior and exterior to the first. Operating as a seeming agent of the Lacanian uncanny, this virtuality is, unlike the first perspectival virtuality, detachable. It is a portable quality, like the smile of the Cheshire cat that endures beyond the individual cat — a Lacanian partial object. Not surprisingly in light of its uncanny status, this secondary virtuality has been well known through mythology, literature, the visual arts, architecture, and later film and popular culture.

These are "naïve" sources. They do not care to prove a point about psychoanalysis or any other theoretical endeavor. They do, however, aim to achieve one thing in particular: astonishment. This is the unexpected ending, the "anacoluthon," that despite its seeming improbability has actually been overdetermined. So, its causes are made causes in the effect of the effect. Because this process involves a retroactive revision of causal temporality and brings to light the structure of *Ananke* — both the necessity of overdetermination and the fate whose appearance fuels astonishment — it is as intimate to Lacan's style of teaching as popular culture and ethnography are indifferent (and thus objective) in relation to psychoanalysis.

In general, Lacan's rhetoric constitutes a secondary virtuality in relation to the substance of his theoretical conjectures. Muller and Richardson have characterized these as taking the form of a "rebus," in that signifiers play a double role. As sentences fail to be completed for the live audience of Lacan's seminars, the rebus expressions grow silently and patiently in the dark enthymemic space between speaker and listeners. It is as if Lacan's presentations took stage directions from his L-schema, forcing the rebus–messaging between the subject, S, and the analyst, A, standing in for the analysand's unconscious to cross over or around an Imaginary puzzle space. This is the curious relationship in architecture between the labyrinth and the temple, emblems of disorder and order that, despite their stylistic contrasts, merge in every negotiation of boundary conditions. Where the labyrinth is, if anything, a device for accumulation, the temple is, if anything, a structure of emergence. But, we cannot avoid the etymology of the temple that links it to sacrifice.[2] The temple/*templum* is raw distinction, and in this architectural model we see the

Figure 2. Diagram of Lacan's example of how retroaction works in the everyday practices of language, where the beginning of the sentence is not known until the end of the sentence. Thus, the temporality of language is split between an apparent split in causality, between a determinative order of cause–to–effect and a revisionary order that relocates the effect to a position internal to cause.

counterpart of the psychoanalytic subject as radically divided. So, the fate of these two buildings in architecture history becomes a kind of supplementary *matheme* for the evolution of Lacan's thinking as it moved through the registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. There is no linear correlation, but there is a curious revelation about psychoanalysis's deployment of secondary virtuality as an efficient cause.

Emergence is a component of the evolutionary theory of exaptation. A trait remains dormant within a species and possibly will never be expressed until some sudden change in environmental conditions provokes it. Within a short period of time, biological time at least, the trait provokes sudden radical changes. Coincidentally, Žižek connects exaptation to an architectural feature, the spandrel, a more or less unused space between the arch and architrave and buttress. While the spandrel is key to spreading out the support of the arch to the horizontal beam above, and is thus more than just infill, Žižek identifies spandrels to "the proper place for utopian dreaming" and a reminder of "architecture's great politico-ethical responsibility."[3] This is quite a jump, but it does justify underscoring Žižek's connection of exaptation, and hence the role of uselessness in architecture, to the paradox of the sorites, the puzzle of the "one grain more" or "one hair less" — gradual processes leading to the phenomena of the "pile of sand" or "bald head" that cannot be located at any specific point. Remove the grains or add back the hairs one by one; there cannot be found any place where the pile is not a pile or the bald head is hairy. But, also like the emergence of the temple from the accumulating folds of the labyrinth, the idea of the pile or bald head lead to the absurd conclusion, that the end was present at the beginning, that the anacoluthon's astonishment was simultaneously effect and cause.[4]

Can we say then, that the emergent quality is the "architecture" within the "building" and solve for once and for all the boring binary that perennially engages architecture theorists? Or, could we even more usefully say that secondary virtuality is the medium of the emergent universal quality, both in architecture and psychoanalysis? Primary virtuality provides pictures with their perspectival rules of order and allows us to anticipate, in space and time, what is not immediately present but just around some corner or over the mountain top; but, secondary virtuality is not simply an extension of this dimensionality. As emergence and exaptation suggestion, it is a latency not of something on par with what conceals it but, as the spandrel suggests, a pure function of split (*Spaltung*). The model here is that of the grin of the Cheshire cat that prompted Alice to say that, while she had often seen a cat without a grin, she had never before seen a grin without a cat. Lacanians are familiar with the grin without a cat. It is the partial object, the quality or state that floats from site to site, agent to agent, act to act. Its portability and unpredictable arrival/ departure times point to the function of arrival and departure *per se* as secondary virtuality's own metric: a portal of pure astonishment, of a sudden appearance "out of the blue" or a vanishing equally instantaneous.

Two features of Lacan's rebus–style teaching bear on this "hierophantic" quality of secondary virtuality. Generally, Lacan "piles on signifiers," so to speak, going to great lengths to extract hidden meanings from sayings, poems, cases, etc. Simultaneously he refuses to give full explanations in the standard fashion of "Q. E. D." As Bruce Fink reportedly has quipped, "You can't take the lack out of Lacan." Following his model of metonymy, where signifiers slide from one to the next without violating the bar that would permit metaphoric replacement, it's possible to say that Lacan's speech adopts the idea of the *Witz*, the

comedic form Freud made famous in his study of jokes' relation to the unconscious. The *Witz* is not just metonymic, it is metaleptic: a kind of "metonymy of metonymy." Metalepsis can be related through a joke told both by Slavoj Žižek and the British comedian Ricky Gervais. A holocaust surviver finally dies after a long and productive life; after a few days in heaven, he happens to see God and, wishing to be upbeat and social, decides to tell God a joke about the holocaust. God goes "That's not funny." The survivor replies, "I guess you had to be there."[5]

Metalepsis in the *Witz* condenses the logic Lacan derives from language. The end must "reply" to the beginning but not in a sense of confirming expectations. The beginning also "responds" in retrospect to how the sentence finishes, as if the beginning of the sentence is a bit like God in the joke; it doesn't "get it," but if it had been in on the punch line, the joke wouldn't be funny, and God wouldn't be God, at least not Yahweh.[6] All meaning involves this temporal dialectic between a necessary forward motion and an *aprés coup* reference connecting and revising both beginnings and endings (Fig. 2). This is a universal feature of the signifying chain, without which Lacan could not have developed the multiple variations of his "graph of desire."[7] The reciprocal motions of succession and retroaction emphasize the role of the portal, which, in the function of exaptation and sorites, highlight the role of the conditional boundary that, in ethnography, literature, art, film, popular culture, etc., to say nothing of the obvious architectural connection, repeat the theme of the labyrinth and the temple. The dyad labyrinthtemple condenses the function of the boundary. The "pure distinction" is occulted within the folds of the labyrinth, to emerge at the point of escape.

There is much historical background to the labyrinth/temple dyad.[8] Still, a few original observations can be made in light of its relation to Lacanian desire–as–exaptation. First, the proper, "Thesean" labyrinth is a meander, not a maze. It is a monogram of *folded* space and, thus, an example of architectural origami.[9] Second, the spatial folding of the labyrinth, in true Deleuzian fashion, occurs in a "fractal" pattern of folds–within–folds, suggesting that the outermost layer could be, theoretically, contained by a self–similar set of folds, and that the innermost folds could also contain an infinite number of self–similar meanders. To avoid the specter of bad infinity, this extensions would have to be connected in the style of the Möbius band, one end wrapping around to meet the other, with a twist. Combining the origami and fractal themes, the labyrinth is, despite its seeming randomness, a paradigm exemplar of the "metallic ratios" required in nature for the optimal distribution of things such as seeds on the heads of sunflowers. On the other side of the dyad, the deployment of one of the metallic ratios, the Golden Section, in temples and other architectural example fascinated Le Corbusier, among many others.[10] The famous "Delian Paradox" also famously involved metallic ratios. When Athens was stricken by the plague, the oracle proclaimed that relief would come only if the altar at the Temple of Delos could be perfectly doubled. The solution involves the cube root of 2, a third degree equation. Although second–degree equations can be solved using a straightedge and compass, third–degree equations cannot. Curiously, all third–degree equations can be solved using origami. The fold has been recognized as both a spiritual and material cure, apparently, for over 2500 years.

What does this say about secondary virtuality and its "portal function"? At the level of mathematics, third–degree equations, $n \ldots = 1 + 1/n$, involve a *recursion* of value where n and $1/n$ relate in a way similar to Lacan's *matheme* for metaphor, $S/s \ldots s \bullet s \ldots s/x = S(1/x)$.[11] The two appearances of the signifying chain, one sublating a signifying function, x, the other specifying a substitution of S, could be read as a palindrome. The *order* of sublation and the *order* of substitution are, in fact, opposite. Sublation comes about as a lack, substitution offers a surplus to the original chain, which (re–)charges each element in the chain. The labyrinth's back–and–forth spatial folding materializes the palindrome in a way reminiscent of Lacan's analysis of "an ocean of false learning," where "learning" (S'1) is negated by "false" (S'2). In "The

Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious," 1/x becomes 1/? to indicate "a falseness that disputation cannot fathom for it is unsoundable — the wave and depth of the imaginary's ἄπειρος in which any vessel is swallowed up should it seek to draw forth something."[12] The palindrome, in the fractal origami of the labyrinth, constitutes the *efficient cause* of the labyrinth and is, in fact, the secondary virtuality that accounts for its use as a (1) prison, in the case of the Minoan Minotaur, (2) tomb, in funerary imagery of the archaic period, and (3) emblem of the erotic tryst, glossed in the Theseus story as Ariadne's famous silver thread, said to draw moonlight, as a kind of early version of fiber–optics, into the depths of the labyrinths "infinite falseness."

In covering both Thanatos and Eros, it seems that secondary virtuality, even in terms of the naïve presentations of culture and art, is nothing more or less than the medium of the death drive, with the additional element of infinite repetition. The conversion of *palintropos harmoniē*, the back–and–forth aspect of the palindrome, into *palintonos harmoniē*, the "eigenvalue" constant of each element of the combined series, corroborates this conclusions in terms that Parmenides might approve.[13] The apparent incongruity between the dynamic alternation between opposite positions and a stasis of constant tension seems to be resolved in the palindrome's structure, where the sums of each part remains the same: 1/9, 2/8, 3/7, 4/6, 5/5, 6/4, 7/3, 8/2, 9/1. This is the idea of the eigenvalue: that which remains the same in order that all else may change. This quality pertains to the way that the metallic sections "recirculate" the value of the previous computation into the formulation of the next. And, if we return to the example of the *Witz*, metalepsis (silently) returns the ending to the beginning,

Can the palindrome suggest more specifically spatial and temporal program to extend study of psychoanalysis's and architecture's co-interests? I have a filmic example that seems to jump the gun on many issues, transferring the argument from the confines of psychoanalysis to the road–show atmospherics of popular culture. I use Lacan's teaching as an excuse and justification: confusion is the optimal state by which knowledge is allowed to emerge in the space between speaking and listening.

Hitchcock's *Vertigo* provides us with an interesting adaptation of Lacan's L-schema, which illustrates how the S—A axis of communication is blocked by the *a—a'* relation of egos, the "pictorial" co-presences of the analyst and analysand. In *Vertigo*, the analyst's consulting room is replaced by the office of Gavin Elster, a wealthy shipbuilding magnate. It is literally a "picture room," blocking/suppressing secret components of a contract Elster, a wealthy shipbuilding magnate, wishes to establish with the retired police detective Scottie Ferguson. There are few more carefully staged scenes in the history of cinema. Every position and movement of the camera, every framed view, every object in the two rooms of the scene, and the shape and relation of the rooms themselves, contribute to a secondary virtuality that confirms the role of this scene within the film as a whole. This seems to justify my claim, that secondary virtuality is not just the medium of the death drive, but a tracer medium. We can track the flow of Symbolic/unconscious energy across the barrier constructed by the Imaginary. This barrier is the site of the temporality of psychoanalysis. According to Bruce Fink, it requires either a "lead–in" and "follow–up" strategy that provokes the analysand to construct her own emancipation. The analyst can anticipate a theme with a provocation (<) or follow up a slip of the tongue or other mistake with a subtle response (>). By this < — > construct, a gap is created that invites the analysand to make her own pronouncement.[14] In the space–time of *Vertigo* the barrier is anamorphic. Its secondary virtuality both detaches and returns to the *same location* by means of a *portal* that, while it seems to separate two distinct territories, *re-inscribes* the one into the other. Thus, the picture room where Elster and Scottie establish their contract connects to the "re-inscription scene" near the terminus of the film, where the secondary virtuality cued by the necklace Judy puts on to wear in Ernie's Restaurant jumps across the barrier thrown up by the primary virtuality of

$$+1 \boxtimes -3 \boxtimes +5 -6$$
$$-1 +2 \boxtimes +4 -5 \boxtimes$$
$$\boxtimes -2 +3 -4 \boxtimes +6$$

Figure 3. Gauss Coding of the Borromeo knot (each row represents the over/under passage of a ring) reveals the presence of a "virtual ring" (the symmetry of the gaps) holding the three together. In my view, this may obviate the necessity of Lacan's specification of a fourth ring to lace the others together; and, the idea of a *virtual* but *effective* presence in the original configuration is closer to the idea of the RSI system presented in Seminar XX. And, the resemblance of the blank, ⊠, to the *objet petit a* is uncanny. It is the gap, the radically permanent lack.

Scottie's contract with Elster.[15] This establishes the death drive's position as efficient cause — the astonishment — of the story, which now has become a *récit fort*.

Before I can lay out this connection, I need to show how, as Žižek has suggested, secondary virtuality is fundamental to Lacanian psychoanalysis. He provides examples of how, in each of the three domains of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary, secondary virtuality is "what makes things work." It is, in contrast with the pictorial virtual reality, the "reality of the virtual" — a Real that operates along the Symbolic vector of the L-schema: the attempted message of the Unconscious to the Subject, S. Although Žižek does not bring in the relation of this virtuality to exaptation, sorites, emergence, or the *rebus*, doing so returns in every instance to the composite *palintonos harmoniē* of the labyrinthtemple, reinforcing the primacy of the gap or *Spaltung*, which in mathematics is the phenomenon of recursion. This Real rotates through each "ring" of the RSI system, a separate Real *of* the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. As a Real *of the Real*, secondary virtuality is the force that pushes the Symbolic unconscious across the barrier thrown up by the Imaginary. It is the moment of silence and astonishment. How does this happen?

Lacan's favorite *matheme* for the RSI system is the Borromeo knot, three rings that seem to lie on top of each other. There is no "last ring" without a ring to top it, no first ring without anything beneath. Rather, the series loops in on itself. Although Lacan at several points seems to doubt the integrity of this knot by adding a ring of *jouissance* to secure the relation between the Imaginary and Symbolic, this is more of a reminder of the L-scheme's barrier construction, where antagonism between the primary virtuality of the Imaginary and the secondary virtuality of the Symbolic focus on the agenda of analysis.

In knot theory, Gauss coding keeps track of how strands lie on top of or beneath other strands. Although a fixed point of view has to be established for a "flat view" of the knot, the code is consistent from any angle. For the Borromeo knot (Fig. 3), each ring has two code sets, one for each of the other rings it touches. Yet, there is an uncanny "missing code," as if to say that there is an invisible fourth ring that is the force responsible for holding together the series. Here, in psychoanalysis's most widely recognizable emblems, is direct evidence of secondary virtuality. The fact of the knot returns to the problem of the templelabyrinth and how something can be static and dynamic at the same time, or how (in the case of exaptation) a trait can be present because it is absent. Architecture's answer is that this present absence is possible because of the *templum*, the (ethnographic) relation to sacrifice. As Giambattista Vico has argued, this relation is mythic; or, to be more precise, metaphoric. The first humans, in sheer fright of thunder, imagine the sky to be the skull of Jove and themselves trapped within a primal Golgotha.[16] As the story of the birth of Athena confirms, this skull is both a trap (a contract) and a contronym allowing emancipation. The word *cœlum* means, Vico notes, both heaven and a wedge. Hephaestus's liberation of Athena by striking Zeus's skull is the story that confirms the contronym, and Athena's occupation of the citadel of Athens confirms the civic architecture specific to this contronym. It's not simply to smooth Freud's rocky

Figure 4. Scottie spies on "Madeleine" from the back entrance of the flower shop where she buys a bouquet duplicating the one held by Carlotta in her portrait. Hitchcock was keen to relate multiple modes of virtuality: the mirror, the painting, the eye of the spy. Through these three "rings" love plants its dyad of negation of negation, the Madeleine that, by being not–Madeleine, is more than Madeleine, the < — > condition. This is a literal depiction of the portal by which arrival and departure are equilibrated. As a consequence, the look and the gaze are occupied from two positions that appear to be antipodes but are in fact the same.

road to the unconscious's dependence on primal terms but to play out the contronym as a binary form of the Gauss code's radical triplicity. For every two there is a third, a secondary virtual that is also the "fourth ring," *jouissance*.

This is Scotty's sad discovery when, after remaking the shopgirl Judy into his lost dream woman Madeleine, the jewel from Carlotta's portrait returns, palindromically. It had "arrived from the past" but now "departs to the future." One portal, two directions and, as it turns out, a second death for the "same woman" thanks to the presence of a third woman. We can see how this works if we revisit the contract room, Elster's office. As with every contract, each party (silently) judges that the trade involves a secret private advantage. The buyer thinks the price is actually a bit low, the seller that it's a bit high. The "too low" and "too high" constitute a contract contronym, without which (economists have pointed out) no contract would be possible. The < + > or rather < — > in Scottie's and Elster's case is the dyad Judy/Madeleine. Elster has substituted the less–valuable actress Judy for the more–valuable heiress, his wife Madeleine. But, at the same time Scottie has in mind not just a crazy woman whose movements he must report but a woman crazy about him, whose *agalma* is wound on Ananke's spindle. Scottie's too–much and Elster's too–little are insulated from the formal terms of the contract by an orthogonality, a 90º angle that allows each to operate independently, as an "x–y axis" (Fig. 5). There is a "z," however. The secret component of each of the men's two separate fantasies about their secret surpluses is a woman, but it is the same woman. Woody Allen's definition of a monster having "the head of a lion and the tail of a lion, but a different lion," applies to this case. There are two Judys but only one jewel, but as Lacan says in Seminar XI, the jewel is ambiguous, anamorphic. The


Figure 5. The contract's orthogonal vectors connect at their extremities with an "anamorphic" dimension, the secondary virtuality that leads to Scottie's realization of his role in the crime.

green that bathes Judy when she is at last transformed into Scottie's ideal ego of Madeleine is the portal traversed in reverse by the red of the ruby jewel. Just as the complementarity of the colors make the red seem to "jump off the object," propelled by the spectators' retinas to "desire" the opposite of the green they have been absorbing, Scottie finally hears — or, rather, is able to "say to himself" — the Unconscious phrase that was, at the very beginning, said but not heard by Elster: "the power and the freedom." This was the *meme* of the rogues who would, in the early days of San Francisco, entrap women, abuse them, and *drive them mad*. Now Scottie repeats these lines, at the end of the film, when returning to the scene of the real Madeleine's murder. He reverse engineers the ruse. Cured of his vertigo, he towers the tower, he con-templates the labyrinth. He has trapped Judy and will facilitate her death, hardly a suicide, because he has, like Elster and the ancestor who abused Carlotta, the power and the freedom — the power of the second virtuality to emancipate, to emerge, to arrive.

The audience has retroactively realized the implications of the first of the sentence of Elster in the first of the sentence of the film. Now that they are at the end of the film's sentence, its anacoluthon becomes evident. The end is made to answer to the beginning to create a *récit fort*, a "strong narrative," and it has been secondary virtuality, which we have been able to map with a Gauss code adapted to the language of film, to see how three women are held in place by a fourth, the fictional victim, the "fictim," the Madeleine that Scottie has loved.[17] Just as the rings have nothing beneath them or above them, the tower that temples the stairy maze or rather meander that is Scottie's labyrinth con-templates his own role as efficient cause. So this is love? The uncanny conclusion of *Vertigo* is that it's not just Scottie's love of Madeleine that has tied this impossible–Real knot with the nothing that is, but every love takes place in a tower that belongs to someone else.

Endnotes

---

[1] Slavoj Žižek, *The Reality of the Virtual*, Ben Wright, director, 2003. URL:https//zizek.uk/slavoj-zizek-the-reality-of-the-virtual-2004/.

[2] The temple existed as a spatial structure surrounding the ritual procedures of divination, involving sacrifice before physical buildings were formalized, so the metrics of the event dominated from the beginning and continued to affect physical designs. The root word of temple, √TEM, relates to the cutting of the sacrificial victim and the quadration of body correlating to the quadration of the sky, where coordinates measured changes in planets and stars.

[3] Slavoj Žižek, "Architectural Parallax: Spandrels and Other Phenomena of Class Struggle," *Lacan Dot Com*, https://www.lacan.com/essays/?page_id=218. In a public lecture given at the Žižek Studies Conference in Cincinnati, 2014, Žižek gave some idea of what he meant by "proper place for utopian dreaming." During World War I, the stretch of devastated "no man's land" between opposing forces became a refuge for deserters from both sides. This included not just soldiers from the main nations of the conflict but conscripts from allies, who spoke a variety of languages. To survive, the refugees cooperated without reference to nationality, however, organizing their own food and medicine procurement systems, cooperative security, and distribution systems. It was, Žižek concluded, an ideal "U. N." well before its time and without discrimination. The zone of the in–between, useless in a radical sense, was the "spandrel" of the battlefield. The unlikely emergence of utopian life demonstrated how uselessness and secondary virtuality (the "anti–pictorial" aspect of war) could produce invention, social innovation, and idealism.

[4] The sorites is another idea that Žižek references without giving its proper name. The paradox of "one grain more," however, constitutes a significant component of Lewis Carroll's symbolic logic. Carroll constructed a series of "Amos Judd" puzzles constructed of statements pairing separated components that appeared in predicated and predicating forms. Reunited, the dispersed "odd" and "even" versions canceled each other out, leaving a predicated and predicating pair that, combined, gave the answer to the puzzle. Carroll's strategy here is to combine dispersion with cancellation/reduction to yield reclamation. The "uselessness" of the grains of sand give rise to an emergent "pile," even in puzzles and jokes.

[5] Slavoj Žižek, Lecture (podcast). Ricky Gervais, podcast. Actually the joke that best captures the relation of metonymy to the rule that sliding signifiers must never cross the bar separating signifiers from the signified is the famous comedians' insider joke, named after its punchline, "The Aristocrats."

[6] The role of "getting it" is expounded in Dan Collins' "Psychoanalysis and Education," *Lacunae* 17 (December 2018): 85–104.

7 In his claim that "all the subject can be sure of is the anticipated image — which he had caught of himself in his mirror — coming to meet him" Lacan captures perfectly the *gap* in the retroactive visit to the point where the subject "was to be," not a positive identity but a state of aspiration accompanies by anxiety. Jacques Lacan, "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire," *Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English*, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 684, 681–683. In "coming to meet him," the image becomes the efficient cause of the subject and the ensemble of motions and intersections involved constitute what I mean by secondary virtuality. In other words, despite the paired condition of lack and over–presence, "<x" and ">x," or more succinctly <>, a gap is specified that here, as in other Lacanian *mathemes*, can be filled only by the object–cause of desire and its associated feeling, a "presence of *jouissance*." In the midst of a completely dynamic condition of arrivals, departures, etc. *jouissance* nonetheless appears, through the medium of a partial object, as a *stasis*, as an always–already *factum*, which, like the grin of the cat, confers a kind of eternity on its unsuspecting host.

8 See Harold Bloom,"The Daemonic Allegorist," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 47, 3 (Summer 1971): 477–480; review of Angus Fletcher, *The Prophetic Moment: An Essay on Spenser* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1971). Fletcher demonstrates that the labyrinthtemple dyad is poetically prior to the architectural articulation of either component part.

9 The poetic priority of the labyrinthtemple is based on the *aprés coup* aspect of language in general. Poetry in particular exploits this aspect of astonishment and retroaction, reinforcing its effects with meter and rhyme.

10 Le Corbusier (Charles-Édouard Jeanneret), *The Modulor: A Harmonious Measure to the Human Scale Universally Applicable to Architecture and Mechanics* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973).

11 See Stephanie Swales, "Metaphor of the Subject," in Stijn Vanheule, Derek Hook, and Calum Neill, eds., *Reading Lacan's Écrits: From "Signification of the Phallus" to "Metaphor of the Subject"* (London and New York: Routledge, 2019), 308–321.

12 Lacan, *Écrits*, 757.

13 Kelsey Wood, *Troubling Play: Meaning and Entity in Plato's* Parmenides (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2005).

14 Bruce Fink, [reference?]

15 The *anagnorisis* of *Vertigo* is based on Scottie's recognition of the necklace that comes out of Judy's dresser drawer, a duplicate or possibly the original of that worn by Carlotta Valdez in her portrait and, later, by Madeleine. Judy's possession of the jewel implicates her as the actress who has played Madeleine. At the same time "Madeleine" is devalued, the ruby loses its value as the symbolic agalma of the beautiful heiress.

16 Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1948), §§9, 62, 377. The "cœlum" reference occurs at §712 and is cited by Vico elsewhere as a contronym.

17 Just as Judy and the actual Madeleine were "held in place by a third, Carlotta, the three of them are governed by the curse that has Judy "die twice," first through the effigy of the actual Madeleine who is dropped off the tower by Elster, and again when she falls from fright at the spectral image of the nun. This is compressed into the idea that the jewel itself is cursed, since it links Carlotta to this second death. Is this Lacan's "ambiguity of the jewel" — the glimmer from the sardine can floating off the coast of Bas Bretagne?