

## XIV, Session 15: the Presentation of André Green

### ANDRÉ GREEN:

LACAN, following a seminar which had made me think a lot, and which had made me tell him how sorry I was that the closed seminars were abolished, gave me the opportunity to address you today, for which I thank him. However, it is necessary that things are very clear from the start: the legislative elections are over, and it is not a confrontation, like the ones you may have heard on the airwaves, which I am going to share today.

I will especially try after reading the seminars that LACAN transmitted to me last week, try to identify a certain number of points about which I will engage in an examination of Lacanian theory in relation to Freudian theory. and the problems it poses.

LACAN, during one of his seminars, said: "What interests us is not Freud's thought, it is the object that he discovered. Indeed, this position is very important, it warns against a Freudian pseudo-orthodoxy, but nevertheless, there are problems which arise as much with the comparison of the spirit and the letter, and this is not here that I will teach you that LACAN is more to the letter than to the spirit.

But it is precisely a question of constituting the letter of FREUD and of attempting to formalize it, I have already spoken last year - during a closed seminar on the question of the object (a) - I would say, in front of the minor seminary, it is today in front of the major seminary that I speak and I believe that this is not without posing a particular problem for me, because in front of the audience selected by LACAN himself from the minor seminary, I at least knew who I was talking to, whereas today I have to tell you that I don't know who I am talking to, and that poses problems for me as I mainly speak to analysts.

I will identify the problems that I will deal with in front of you and that we can group under five chapters:

- I will speak, first of all, of the "Id" and of its grammatical truth in its relationship with the unconscious.
- I will then address the question of repetition in its relationship with diachrony.
- I will then address the drive in relation to language.
- I will continue with the examination of what I will call "drive classes", namely the questions of so-called "goal-driven" drives, inhibited" in relation to drives with uninhibited goals insofar as they could tell us something about the relations between the Big Other and the (a).
- And finally, I will conclude with some remarks concerning the subjective unity, that is to say the relation of the unifying One to the spot 1, in the relationship of the structure to the Subject.

LACAN, during the seminar of February 1, 1967, said: "It is not easy to think the Es. »

It is especially in the seminar of January 11 that LACAN gave the most complete formulations concerning the Es. What is it? It is. It just disappeared. A little more was going to be.

Something that points towards being, says LACAN. In the *Écrits*, page 517, LACAN specifies: "It is a place of being that is at stake. This position is connected to the proposition that LACAN himself qualified as pre-Socratic: "Wo est War Soll ich verden. LACAN gave several translations:

- in La Chose freudienne: "Where that was, there must I arise."
- then in The Instance of the Letter: "Where that was, I must come."
- and finally - an omission that I point out to him in his self-signed index, p. 864, i.e. the last definition is not indicated, as it is the last, it seems important to me to give it:

"Where it was, there as a subject should I happen."

- Relationship - therefore about the Id - of thought to being: "It is not a being, but a dis-being" (seminar of January 11)

["...the Id is a thought bitten by something which is not the return of being, but as of a 'dis-being']

Finally the point, the definition one might say, which is pivotal, to use a word much used in recent years:

The Id is properly speaking what, in discourse, as logical structure is very exactly "everything that is not 'I'", that is to say all the rest of the structure. And when I say logical structure, I mean grammatical. (seminar of January 11).

Here is centered the problem that we have to define with regard to the question of the Id:

- the unconscious is structured like a language,
- the Id, therefore in relation to the unconscious is "everything that is not I", all the rest of the logical structure as grammatical, which is the essence of the Id. (seminar on January 11)

In this regard, we are witnessing in part, if not a refutation, at least an establishment, of LACAN's previous positions concerning the Ça parle, "Ça parle" is a short-circuit of the relationship It - unconscious but on condition - specifies LACAN - let it be realized that it is not a question of any being. This, then, is the Lacanian position concerning the Id.

I will now turn to Freud to consider three major texts. I believe that we find ourselves here faced with very difficult problems, and which certainly imply additional reflection to examine the compatibility or incompatibility of Lacanian theory with the Freudian position, at least in its letter.

In *Le Moi et le Id* FREUD gives the definition of the Id: to do this, he will first propose a reasoning which is as follows: he will say that there are verbal - auditory representations, and visual representations, the verbal representations being auditory, the visual representations being obviously not auditory.

And he will say that the passage from these unconscious representations to the conscious will necessarily pass through the stage of the preconscious, while there will exist another category of phenomena which will never pass through the preconscious state and which will pass directly from the unconscious state, to the conscious state. These are affects. What is the point of this reminder?

It is precisely to specify that the unconscious will include at least two sectors: that of representation and that of affects and that the representations will be the support of the combinatory representation of words,

or representation of things, whereas the affect he cannot enter into any combination. If, however, we maintain the position that I have defended here concerning the affect, insofar as it is a signifier, we see that where we come up against problems of suturing for what it affects.

So what about language?

With regard to language, in the discourse of the analysand we have elements which will come into play and which will not be those of combinatorics, which will be those of the punctuation of discourse, of its pauses, of its cuts, of prosody, of accentuation and it is certainly not the same thing for an analyst to say two things which are practically the same, when he reports a session, he then says to me in a strangled voice:

*“But then it would be my dead father I was talking to in the dream.”*

the same with the obsessional:

*“But then it would be my dead father, to whom I was talking in the dream.”*

In 1932, in the 32nd Conference, FREUD gives the most extensive definition of the id and which is certainly the one which brings the most clarification and it is I believe above all with regard to this definition or this description that the problem will arise. of the question of the grammatical truth of the Id. It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality.

We approach the id by analogies, we call it "a cauldron full of bubbling excitations" where we appear open at one of its extremities to somatic influences, and there taking into it instinctual needs which find their psychic expression in it, but we cannot say under what substratum. It is full of energy reaching it from the drives, but it has no organization, produces no common will, only an attempt to bring about the satisfaction of drive needs to the observance of *the pleasure principle*.

The logical laws of thought do not apply to the id, this is true above all of the law of non-contradiction, there FREUD will take up exactly the same terms as he described the primary processes and the unconscious, ie i.e., the different characteristics that you know, i.e.:

- the coexistence of opposites,
- the absence of negation,
- the non-existence of temporo-spatial references, and FREUD insists enormously on this timelessness.

He ends more or less on this: the economic factor or if you prefer quantitative, is intimately linked to the pleasure principle, dominates all these processes, the instinctual investments seeking the discharge, that is in our opinion all that there is, in time.

Freud nevertheless insists on the fact that these discharge characteristics completely ignore the quality of what is invested, what in the self we would call an idea. Well, I refer you to these pages, but I would also like to remind you that concerning this 31st (?) conference, FREUD said: we will no longer use the term unconscious, in the systematic sense and we will give what we have described until there a better name which is no longer subject to misunderstanding, following a verbal usage of NIETZSCHE and adopting a suggestion of GRODDECK we will call it in the future: the Id.

This, then, is the Freudian position. All that can be said is that, when a few years before his death, Freud will write the abridgement, he will take up these same formulations in a direction that I will call, even

more radicalized. FREUD even gives details concerning what the id contains, he says: the inherited, the present at birth, fixed in the constitution and above all the drives which originate in the somatic organization and find their psychic expression under a form which is unknown to us.

So what is the meaning of this operation carried out by FREUD? Since we find there terms quite identical to those that Freud uses for the primary process and for the unconscious, we can say that the id comprises three polarities:

– that which I will call constituent of the symbolic, condensation and displacement.

– A polarity that I will call, for lack of a better word, categorical, that is to say the definition of the Id in relation to the concept of negation, in relation to time or space.

Finally a third polarity that I will call energetic on this I do not need to explain myself, that is to say the tendency essentially to the discharge and to the quantitative process.

What we have not noticed enough is the solidarity, I would say the almost consubstantiality, of this reworking of the 2nd topography, with the introduction of the death drive. In fact, if we want to talk about symbolization, we have to talk about structure and this is the central point that I will develop throughout this presentation, in that structure arises from an action linked to the antagonism of eros and the death drive.

Grammatical truth, concatenation, suture, is the result of a work that includes the counterwork of the death drive. Suture, signifying chain, the counting 1 is identified with the 0 insofar as it is indispensable to the process. But, and it is especially on this that I would like to be able to draw your attention, the 0 can dissolve the operation to prevent it from happening again and everything can remain at this 0 without taking a step further.

It will certainly not be by facetiousness that I will return to the metaphor of the cauldron and I will associate on this, I will associate by offering you two other circumstances where the cauldron is in question in FREUD. The first will be that of the witticism, A - it is FREUD who says it - has borrowed a copper cauldron from B, when he returns it, B complains that the cauldron has a large hole which puts him out of order/use. Here is A's defense:

- 1) I never borrowed a cauldron from B,
- 2) the cauldron had a hole when I borrowed it from B,
- 3) I returned the cauldron intact.

I think that this presentation of the defense of A is the best suited to make us reflect, indeed, on the question of logic, the logic of the unconscious and precisely on the sub-logic that LACAN defends. Is this example not worth the “green ideas”?

Not so much GREEN ideas, but green ideas, or green ideas.

Second example: *Macbeth*. Freud in Analysis finished, analysis interminable, will speak of the witch metaphysics without which it is not possible to take a step further when one seeks to understand.

Let us question precisely these witches of MACBETH, the one that FREUD analyzes in his article on the exceptions: the witches are leaning over the cauldron and they are making a prediction, i.e. that is exactly

the situation of the upside down, that is not the situation dip, it's not MACBETH answering a riddle, it's an answer given to him as a fallacious answer, we'll see how.

For they say, "for /.../ of woman born shall arm Macbeth." "For none who be born of a woman shall reach Macbeth."

It is on this, you know, that MACBETH is going to base himself. If we consider this witch talk, we find ourselves precisely formed of two categories or two different styles:

- a first style of riddle and prediction,
- a second style which is a purely incantatory style.

The first style will seem to me that of the place of grammatical truth, the second will seem to me something that I will call precisely as a style proper to the Id. One without the other is not.

Last example: let's see FREUD in front of MICHELANGELO's Moses. Two parts here again: an enigma, an affect. An affect which is that Freud feels himself, watched, by the statue of MOSES, he cannot take his eyes off it, he enters the church of St Peter, like one of those little Jews who formed the tribe of Israel, like that scum, said FREUD, blowing MOSES's gaze.

The Jew looks at the Jew, and the elucidation will be precisely the elucidation of combinatorics, that is to say of the meaning of the finger, of the index finger in the beard, but there again I insist: FREUD does not could not have done the analysis if he had not first felt concerned by the affect, by the evidence of the affect I might say, or more exactly the constraint of the affect.

What am I, asks FREUD? He receives an answer just as MOSES received one: "I am that I am".

I do not defend affect against combinatorics. I am simply defending the signifying status of affect, whose combination does not seem to me to be able to account for. Here we will have another perspective, that of timelessness and the concept of repetition. Before moving on to the rehearsal, I will read you a short dialogue from my bill:

- "What is that?"
- "It's nothing. That's all. »
- "Where is it? »
- "Where it was. »
- "How so?"
- "Like this. »
- "What does that mean? »
- "It desires. »
- "How so?"

- “It repeats itself. »
- “Repeat? »
- “Repeat. »
- “Until when? »
- “Until that. »

So let us see what it is about the question of repetition. Repetition is therefore an essential qualification of the drive. It is the guiding principle of a field insofar as it is properly subjective, says LACAN, and to advance here the relationship of the 1 accountant and the One signifier. The 1 of recurrence is only established by repetition, which happens when, through the effect of repeating, what was to be repeated becomes the repeated.

What is the relation of repetition to the big Other, alienation as signifier of the Other, insofar as it makes the Other a field marked by the same finitude as the subject himself, it is the algorithm well known to you:  $S(\bar{A})$ .

LACAN observes that the god of the philosophers is not present in analytic theory as a theory of the subject subject to the laws of language instead of the Other, as the place of speech. This radical otherness, present in Freud, we must of course seek it in castration, which is precisely the sign of finitude. But according to FREUD the original fantasies are innate, they are, as LACAN says, in the position of key signifiers, seduction — castration — primitive scene, organizers of human desire.

But here I must point out another datum which seems to me to be neglected in the whole of the French psychoanalytical movement, whatever side it may be. It's a dreadful name, it's: philogenesis. I think that philogenesis, the death drive, and the second topography are absolutely inseparable data for understanding everything about Freudian theory after 1920.

This philogenesis does not have a seriological function since it orders desire, but in fact its function is to account for what could be called the hiatus between individual experience and causes and consequences, namely : that for a certain number of experiments the minimum of facts, of causes, involve the maximum of effects. This is precisely why a conception so-called “genetics” of development can in no way respond, since quantitatively what will it be?

It will be as the patient I was leaving earlier said, telling me about her infantile sexual curiosity, about the games where she put a pillow on her stomach to look pregnant: “It is very little”. It is very little indeed if there were not key signifiers to give all the organizing weight in the structure. But this does not solve the problem of what we have to think of phylogenesis. This would therefore mean, according to Freud, that something else exists in the time of the subject which is not the time of the individual.

Repetition as the essence of instinctual functioning is the resumption at the level of the subject of a time that I will call impersonal. The one that belongs to the parent. Everything would therefore happen as if in the synchronic moment, we find there the same division as for the subject, namely: that FREUD introduces into the time of the subject another time which is not the same, I call it, in connecting it to the Lacanian vocabulary, the time of the Other.

To make the dipe, as my friend ROSOLATTO says, you need three generations of man, because the Oedipus is the double difference:

- the difference between the parents,
- difference between progenitors and begotten.

How it is both structure and history.

[...] mark things from the death drive on phylogenesis, we are going to see it in the report: repetition - memory.

It is necessary here, in the Freudian theory to introduce a change, it is not me who introduces it, it is FREUD, this change will be precisely the one which distinguished according to the three authorities, three categories of phenomena which will be different for each of the three instances. This is what he will say: what the drive is to the id, the perception will be for the ego. But we've come to this to the point where we wonder if something does not work equivalently for the superego, or correspondence. Indeed, we find this, and this is described by FREUD in an extremely specific way and in a way that, in my opinion, has been much neglected: he calls this the function of the ideal. What is the function of the ideal?

It is essentially about the function of the dead father which is constituted around the totem. The funeral ritual restores the bonds with the deceased, links that the dead have abolished and that memory venerates. Death is the necessary condition for signs to proceed effectively through their poverty. Economically, the operation has effects comparable to what Freud confers to the functioning of thought which, compared to sensory or libidinal investment, has the advantage of considerable savings.

Thus the fragility of the bonds that unite the subject to the deceased, through memory and the maintenance of their preservation through ritual, also require a considerable rise in the level of investment in order to combat the perpetual threat of their dissolution. In other words, it is the question of the small quantities of energy which characterize the functioning of thought as LACAN reminded us, but these small quantities of energy are only tenable insofar as the general level of investment in the system is globally distorted.

The totem ceases to be a thing, it is not enough to be a witness, it is an absence consecrated by the underlying process, by the power of illusion, that is to say of desire, the enlargement of the disappeared ... *lerguhätgung* [?!] is a Freudian term fills the whole scene, even the father of HAMLET or the father of ORESTES, but at the same time here he is also bound by his place, the dead father, by the alliance which is sealed between the infinite prolongation of his presence and the protection, benevolence, or better benevolent neutrality, which he must grant. This function of the ideal as "field trainer" of illusion is therefore what could refer precisely to the big Lacanian Other, of course by death, the death of the father and the castration of the mother, which is repeated in the drive is both the life drive compulsion and the death drive compulsion.

LACAN specifies this relation of language to death in one of his seminars: language, he says, does not dominate this foundation of sex insofar as it is perhaps more deeply linked to the essence of death on what It is about sexual reality.

In conclusion to this chapter: repetition is therefore well founded in the distinction between the unifying One and the counting One. I will put this Unifying on the account of this individual experience, and the

counting 1 which is identified with the 0 of the subject with this trace of the function of the ideal which surrounds each operation, but the 0 is a double use.

It is the 0 of the structure of the subject, it is the 0 to which the subject risks being effectively reduced, that is to say, that of silence which does not open onto any operation. Rocket counters counting down: 5-4-3-2-1-0, it's on, it's over.

“...when FREUD wants to articulate the drive, he cannot do otherwise than go through the grammatical structure ...” (Seminar 18-01-1967)

LACAN to draw under his reference The drives and their destiny, and from the example of *Ein kin wind schlagen*, which leads to the reflection:

— “It is only in a world of language that the “I want to see” can take on its dominant function, leaving it open to know from where and why.

— I'm looking.

— It is only in a world of language, as I said the last time just to point it out in passing, that “A child is beaten” has its pivot value.

— It is only in a world of language that the subject of the action raises the question that supports it, namely: for whom does it act? » (18-01-1967)

The first remark is that when one is tempted to attach function to language one is always led to reserve it for works prior to the death drive (1915-1919 for the texts in question here). The world of language is linked to the combination of representations. However, in *The Drives and Their Destiny*, the *Vorstellung Repräsentanz* is never mentioned by Freud, it only appears with repression (text on repression). All drives and their destiny rest on the analysis of partial drives: scopophilia and sado-masochism. The fates of the drives are four:

- turning against oneself
- reversal into its opposite,
- repression,
- sublimation (chapter that FREUD was never able to write)

... which leaves aside the question of representatives, if you engage in this amusing little exercise which consists, as LACAN has done several times in front of you, of taking a strip of paper and directing it towards the outside, turning it against you, and turning it into its opposite, that is to say upside down, you get the band of Möbius of which you are told so often.

The double reversal is therefore the condition of the structure, the suture is the precondition of the combinatorics of the representatives, the question then becomes to know: what is put together in a circuit.

Let us now ask ourselves about the torus of language. I will refer here to the general linguistics of Ch. BALLY to read there the following propositions, paragraph 214:



*“Uncommunicated thought, he says, is synthetic, that is to say global and unarticulated. Synthesis is the set of linguistic facts constrained in the discourse of linearity, and in the memory of the monoscene. »*

So remember this fact, that linearity and monoscene go together. A form is all the more analytical when it satisfies the requirements of linearity and mono-scene. BALLY says: we hope to show that in reality *dystaxia*, that is to say non-linearity, is the usual state, and that it is the correlative of polyscene and that consequently the discordance between signified and meaning is the rule. Unfortunately I believe that reading BALLY shows that he is not up to the task of supporting his project.

Nevertheless, let us note here the relationship between linearity and signifying chain and non-linearity, condensation. If we go back to more recent currents, how to adhere to a generative conception of grammar, when this one claims to want to eliminate the ambiguity or the misunderstanding in the rejection in the name of the semantic anomaly and which relates to the facts and the situations which are on the contrary for us the firmest ground on which rests not analysis but psychoanalysis. The aim of this linguistics is the absolute transparency of discourse, that is to say of the structure of the subject.

When FREUD gives the definition of the drive in 1915, the demand for work is imposed on the psychic as a result of its link with the corporeal, we can therefore isolate three terms: psychic corporeal, psychic work, that is: source, object, goal.

Later, in *Civilization and Its Discontents* FREUD will give another infinitely more important proposition, perhaps not more important but to be taken into consideration, that is to say that between the journey from the source to the goal, the drive becomes operative psychically, whether we like it or not, we are witnessing here the source-object suture which starts from the body and returns to the body by *befriedigung*, in this interval the drive is psychically constituted by the operation of the suture.

What someone in a recent article called: the biological hypostasis, as an incoherence of Freudian thought, for want of its author, of being in the past, a medical prejudice, it is for me, for us, a necessity. It is not enough to denounce it, Freud returns to it constantly until the summary to the great displeasure of those who would like to get rid of this embarrassing witness. I read :

*“But in return that in considering biology as the model of scientificity inaccessible to an essentially provisional analytical theory, Freud ends up in pure speculation, is enough to indicate that this biology is an ideological myth, the eschatology of psychoanalysis. »*

FREUD said: “that does not prevent existing” after CHARCOT. The philosopher does not love his body, he has devoted his love to wisdom and if he abuses it, it must be for a good cause. What must be accounted for, on the contrary, is the relentlessness of a philosophical tendency to exclude this biological. We are still witnessing a foreclosure, a rejection of the Other, and why wouldn't this be a foreclosure whose consequences would be at least as disastrous.

How I regret that this author did not share my experience when 15 years ago, being an intern in a psychiatric hospital on the outskirts, I was dealing with hebephreno-catatonics at a time when miracle drugs did not exist , I remember a young man whose life had been normal until around the age of 17, who, where he was, in the psychiatric hospital, was forced to remain completely naked on a board, eating with his fingers, grumbling some unintelligible words, because he was destroying everything in his hands and had returned to a condition that means a lot to us.

But in any case, when FREUD speaks of psychosis, of the wall of biology, he knows what he is talking about, he knows it all the better because I think this author will not contradict me if I tell him that exegesis

of the texts is good, but that the practice confronted with the requirements of the texts certainly has an enlightening virtue.

This is what LACAN said, concerning this monastic withdrawal. I think that if, as LACAN reminds us, we have contributed nothing to the progress of the biological as analysts, we are still obliged to think about it and perhaps we cannot say anything about it but that we have to articulate the body's relationship to thought through the effects of language.

This language that Freud calls progress in intellectuality, this progress in intellectuality, was established at the cost of an illusion and it must be remembered. Quote from Moses and Monotheism:

*“the omnipotence of thought, was, we suppose, an expression of the pride of mankind in the development of language which resulted in such extraordinary progress in intellectual activities. »*

How does the biological remember us? By the origin myth? Not only, at all stages, and especially the essential one, that of the end of latency, which establishes a cut in the subject, rupture of the latency phase, renewal and appearance of adolescence. It is enough to have seen once the somatic sexual transformation of a boy or a girl at this age to realize that if they are blushing, it is not only because they have thoughts that bother them, but that these thoughts are embodied in a body, in a structure, a structure of the body which is strongly structured, and a structure of the thought between the two: the Id.

What body is it? Is it a question of the body repelled by the signifier? Yes, probably, but not entirely. Not of the body submitted to the structure of the signifier. Is it a question of the body of biology? — yes, no doubt, but not entirely, not of the body subjected to the structure of the vital organization.

So? Half flesh, half fish? Here I will use an analogy that LACAN used himself, which concerned the in-between death. I could call that: the in-between body. It is not completely in one, it is not yet completely in the other, it is traversed by the signifier in its circuit but insofar as its circuit is to be constituted and its constitution is constantly threatened.

Suture, concatenation, metonymy, linearity, are the chains in which the subject gets caught, but they are also those that he breaks periodically if he takes the step of meaning, he is also constantly threatened with nonsense.

Let us conclude: it is necessary to unite the force and the direction.

Not to oppose them, and to show their consubstantiality, they are spouses in the law, force must remain with the law, a law which does not rely on any executive is not a law, they are united in power, the father has the real power to castrate and every father is infanticide.

It is only necessary to reread The Economic Problem of Masochism, to understand the interpenetration of the force of meaning which is at the same time the interpenetration of nature and culture, this is what makes the concept of work necessary, it is the condition of the transformation into meaning and the return of meaning as strong meaning.

Work, the word is in Freud, work of the dream, work of mourning, work of the cure, and who says work says value. The value of which SAUSSURE speaks, he remarks that it is not present in all the fields of science, only a few sciences have the privilege of it: linguistics, economics, let us add psychoanalysis.

Insofar as it is a question of applying the Saussurean definition, all values are made up of:

1) by a dissimilar thing, capable of being exchanged for one whose value is indeterminate.

2) or by similar things that can be compared with those whose value is in question.

If you have the time to reflect on these definitions, you will see that they relate very directly to the object (a), and the relationship to A.

What is work? That's it! [He unfolds a large sheet of paper on which there is a diagram] You don't understand a thing, it doesn't matter, I myself didn't understand a thing. It is a patient who is in her seventh year of analysis who made a point of showing it to me because it was her job, she made a point of showing it to me, and in the Marxist sense one would say that she is alienated like she says so herself. It happens to be a boiler: one more cauldron She always told me: *"How sad, I will never see this boiler, I only draw it, I will never know what it really looks like"*.

But insofar as it is a question of psychoanalytic alienation, I will say that she does not know that it is her body that she is showing me, that it is her sex that she shows me as she has no man or child or penis and that she is one of the sick, if I say that she is in her seventh year, it is that there was in her this foreclosure of the body which made her almost stupid and which manifested itself in her by an inhibition to work which is to be related, as Freud has always taught us, as a result of the inhibition to infant masturbation.

The hour is very late, I have come to the 5th chapter, that of the instinctual classes in their relation to A and to (a).

This is the most perilous point of my presentation, and I fear not to meet with LACAN's support, I will support it, but I wonder if he can follow me that far in agreement. By drive class I distinguish, with Freud, the partial drives on the one hand, and the drives with an inhibited goal. I do not question the status of the partial drive which has been perfectly articulated and with which I completely agree.

I would especially like to address the problem of the so-called inhibited goal drive, I could only do so in a cursory way, and I would refer you to the text that appeared in the unconscious where I devote a paragraph to it. I would like to show that drives with inhibited goals, far from being a simple drive destiny like any other, are in fact a drive class which is to be opposed from the outset to uninhibited purposeful impulses.

I could give you a very precise demonstration. I would simply tell you that from 1912 to 1932 FREUD granted them a place. What is the definition of so-called inhibited goal drives in 1932?

*"Furthermore we have reasons for distinguishing drives which are inhibited as to their aim, instinctual movements coming from sources well known to us, having an unambiguous aim, but which undergo a stoppage in their path towards satisfaction, so that if this results in cathexis of durable objects, and a permanent inclination, such are, for example, the relations of tenderness which undoubtedly arise from the sources of sexual needs and invariably renounce their satisfaction.* (New Conferences).

If we try to articulate things regarding these two drive categories, what can we say? We can remember another quote from FREUD according to which the child, it is when he loses the breast that he becomes capable to see as a whole the person to whom belongs the organ which brings him satisfaction, and FREUD to say: *"At this moment the drive becomes auto-erotic"*.

That is to say that we have there with regard to the object (a), the partial object, this loss as definitive and it is at this moment when this loss occurs that the child is capable of see the whole mother. In short, either

the breast or the mother, never both at the same time. I would like to show that with regard to the mother, in the same way that the lost object is at the source of the rediscovery from the partial drives, and from the exchange that will be able to take place between the objects, the permutation of objects and goals, possibility of the replacement of the breast by something else another part: a handkerchief, anything.

In the other sector, what we have to do at the moment of the separation of mother and child is precisely the bringing into play at that moment of the drive with an inhibited goal which allows, I would say, the folding back of the subject on itself, but this operation is itself underpinned by what I have tried to articulate in object(a), on the concept of the negative hallucination of the mother.

In sum, to what corresponds to the rediscovery or to the search for rediscovery in the body of the subject, of the lost breast, we would have in the sphere of the big Other the negative hallucination of the mother. This hallucination is rare to encounter in the clinical material, we find ourselves here in the presence of the clinico-theoretical hiatus which is absolutely irreducible. I would have liked to develop this more precisely.

In short, what is internalized at the moment of the loss of the object "breast" is precisely the breast as a lost object, an internalized loss, and what is internalized at the moment when the possibility of seeing the mother as a whole appears. , this is what mythically preceded this moment, the silent framing of the pleasure activity linked to the drive as it was not about this pleasure itself.

That is to say, the silent framing of the mother as the structure of the subject which has come to create the identificatory mold of the primary identification and having as its support the negative hallucination of the mother. This is important because Freud opposes the relation to the mother as being a relation to the senses to the relation of the father as being a relation to the senses.

Sensoriality, meaning.

Everything happens as if the dialectical stage, the negative hallucination of the mother, which is constitutive of the symbolic, insofar as this stage is inserted between the senses and meaning and insofar as it constitutes the identificatory mold of the subject. If we link to this the operation of reversal which presides over the formation of the band of Ms. of the effect of this double reversal, something which corresponds perhaps in LACAN's thought to what he calls the double loop. But this closure of the subject, this suture, is only possible insofar as the drive with an inhibited goal has operated, that is to say that the current of cathexis rather than seeking its object outside itself turns against the subject by turning against itself and the reversal into its opposite of activity into passivity, the subject passivated and it always is from that moment on.

It is therefore in the union of these two drive categories that we would have the relation of the big Other and to (a), the (a) as being the support of the partial drives and the big Other as the result of the drives with an inhibited goal.

This is important because we are contrasting two categories:

- the category of loss,
- the category of lack,

The category of the loss as it is relative to the object (a), the category of the lack as it is relative to the big Other insofar as this big Other is always attacked in this way, it is therefore always barred. But here too I

thought that LACAN would perhaps object because we find ourselves faced with a situation which has called for such vigorous criticism: the famous genital drive.

Why ?

What I am led to defend concerning the big Other is perhaps not the genital drive, but it is insofar as the result of the operation is auto-erotism: the formation of durable and permanent investments, there is a link between auto-erotism and tenderness, it is not for nothing that FREUD gives as the essence of auto-erotism lips that kiss each other and the manifestations that we know well: the child who twists the lock of hair, caresses the lobule of the ear, and the connection of these phenomena with tenderness is quite important.

She therefore invites me to postulate, if not the defense of the famous genital drive, at least a genital vocation of the object from the outset, this genital vocation of the object will be a current of investment which will respond to the current of investment in the goal. says inhibited and who will stay there dormant until puberty. It will stay there.

The field will remain free to partial drives and we will have two currents: tender current and sensual current, the sensual current being the support of the combinatorics of the subject with the possibility of a permutation of goals and objects whereas what specifies the drive to The inhibited goal is that it does not change its object, it does not need to lose it, it is enough for it to amputate itself from it.

Amputating it and losing it are two different things, this is how two categories originate here: that of the lack, that of the loss insofar as they lead to different results and which, at the moment of the In adolescence, their relationships are reversed, that is to say that the partial drives which occupied the front of the stage are brought to a position introducing pleasure, there obviously the experience of each is speaking, while the final term is at that moment: the field linked to the genital drive, which obviously no longer inhibits its purpose at that moment, she literally discovers it as if it were the first time.

This is what I have tried to articulate on the relationship of the big Other and the (o), this would require further information. I will therefore conclude on the problem of subjective unity insofar as it concerns the question of primary narcissism.

LACAN criticized the position of contemporary authors on fusion, I share this criticism with him, and I think that the distinction he brings between the unifying One and the counting 1 is essential, the closing of the circuit shows it to us, as a support of a chain where we will be able to count, in every sense of the term, the 0 of the child of primary narcissism is linked to the One of the mother.

This One of the mother is marked insofar as it is amputated from the (a) that the child is for her, the child is both: 0 and (a) for the mother insofar as it is dropped from her by a cutting effect, which has a pretty name: "deliverance" in gynecology. The mother does not know any more than the child that the latter is the (a) of her desire for a child from her father, the paternal metaphor is therefore very original, the passage to the act: important, that of the break of the subject which goes from 0 to 1.

Starting from the name and where in the maternal encounter the circuit is closed by the double reversal, this double reversal leads by the closing of this circuit to the reversal of the drive polarities of the mother and the child and to a phenomenon that I call the primary decusation which is the correlate of this double reversal of this crossing of instinctual polarities between the mother and the child. What is established in this way is the originary difference of the subject, the difference between the progenitor and the begotten,

it's me who counts said the child, the result is that of the One unifying as a decoy, of course, since the object is lost, but if the object is lost desire will remain and desire becomes an object, is made object.

Here I was interested to read in BENVENISTE the relation of being or having, where BENVENISTE shows that in fact there are not two auxiliaries, there is only one which is the verb to be, to have being: to belong to someone. This reminded me of this reading of Freud: to have and to be in the child, the child as estimating an object relation by an identification. I am the object, having is the later of the two, after the loss of the object, it relapses into being. Example: the breast, the breast is part of me: I am the breast, only later will I have it, that is, I am not.

What is the unifying One, I will propose a definition whose terms will be borrowed from the Lacanian vocabulary: I would say that the unifying Unifying insofar as it is that of the primary narcissism of the subject insofar as it is constituted as the unity of the unifying One, it is the erasing of the trace of the other in the desire to the One. The desire of the One being obviously taken in its meaning the largest. We know that this is a process doomed to failure, to psychotic alienation.

But what about the relationship of structure to subject?

I would say that the Subject as a structure is constantly taken between the 0 and the 1 and the One as a unifying as a decoy, the 0 as an accounting 1, but also that this 0 must have the double status, that is to say that he can be :

– where the passage from 0 to 1 is production of the chain, necessity of the 0 for combinatorics,

– or the 0 as radical desubjectivation.

When I spoke of this schizophrenic, I would say that this boy had nothing to learn on the level of primary masochism from M. de SADE's heroines. This radical desubjectivation which causes the 0 in question to bring the subject back to the 0 of the body or to the 0 of death.

The conception of the subject as structure is only compatible with a conflicting view, which is to take the 0 literally, what FREUD called the antagonism between eros and the death drive, if all the noise of life comes from Eros, the death drive has the last word.

To please everyone, I will end with a Japanese quote: (TCHI NUAN died in 740)

*“Before studying Zen for thirty years the mountains appeared to me as mountains and the waters as waters, when I had reached a deeper knowledge, I came to no longer see the mountains as mountains nor the waters like waters, but now that I have penetrated the real substance I have found the remedy, for it is right that I see the mountains again as mountains and the waters again as waters. »*

老僧三十年前未參禪時、見山是  
山、見水是水。及至後來親見知識、  
有箇入處、見山不是山、見水不是  
水。而今得箇體歇處、依然見山祇  
是山、見水祇是水。

CH'ING Yuan (660-740) *Recueil de la Transmission de la lampe*, in « *Carrément Zen* », Moundaren, 1997, p.54.

**LACAN:**

I thank GREEN very much for his contribution to us today. I do not need, I think, for informed ears, to underline all that, in his presentation, could deeply satisfy me.

If he brought many questions on various levels concerning my agreement or my distance from FREUD or concerning the elucidation, the questioning, of such and such a point of what is here work in progress of something that is built and developed in front of you and for you work in progress, one more thank you that I owe him, since, thanks to the stage that his intervention constitutes, the level of these questions is posed which should allow us in the sequel, not only what I will certainly do, always in pointing to the point to which I connect, to respond to it, but even to continue the edification, I would say, by taking the location of this level that brings the study really so deep, so substantial, that it produced today before you today, in reference - I can say it and I think he will feel the homage - in reference to my speech.

I can only add my compliments on the forbearance he showed during this little ordeal, to which we have all been subjected and for which I must in some way apologize to him, since certainly, this is not It was not his person who was on the occasion. So I'll give you an appointment ... next meeting on Wednesday ... 7:15, that makes April 11th.

There will be no seminar on April 4 as some might expect.

In the room: twelve! ...twelve !

LACAN - Twelve! *April 12.*