

What is *jouissance*?

Don Kunze

The (seemingly) all-purpose term animating all of psychoanalysis is *jouissance*, the pleasure-pain associated with sexual conclusion extends into nearly every aspect of human mental and social life. Yet, it is controversial in a literal way: it inverts energy, converting pain into pleasure and pleasure into pain, automatically — which leads to comparisons with mechanical switches, circuits, filters, and capacitors. The subject does not so much “have” *jouissance* as *jouissance* has the subject, holds it in its thrall, bribes it, lures it, coerces it. At the same time *jouissance* masquerades itself, materializing in the form of that *je ne sais quois* of *algama* that makes something or someone curiously attractive.

Enough of this enigma stuff! This short essay will be long enough as it is. The aim is to look at how *jouissance* becomes the driving force behind otherwise inexplicable behaviors. I cut the ribbon on this project by going to a famous case everyone fan of Dan Collins should know, the way *jouissance* plays the role of the critical supplement in projects of knowledge that otherwise elude the formula of “justified true belief.” Collins wrote about how Edmund Gettier provided conclusive refutation of the thesis that knowledge could be defined as justified true belief, finalizing a series of classic refutations that began with the pre-Socratics.

	TRUTH	BELIEF	JUSTIFICATION
knowledge	1	1	1
faith	1	1	0
resistance	1	0	1
ignorance	1	0	0
error	0	1	1
rumor	0	1	0
rationalization	0	0	1
science	0	0	0

The setting of all refutations has been: “we *should* be able to define knowledge as something true that we can also justify and believe in, but we always come up short.” The “short,” in short, is enjoyment. It is not enough that we can justify and believe in the truth, sometimes whether it’s really true or not; we must also *enjoy* knowledge. Knowledge requires *jouissance* in such an uncanny way that we have to make a bold conjecture: if knowledge really does require *jouissance*, could that mean that knowledge IS *jouissance*? Or, perhaps knowledge and *jouissance* are the two sides of the same coin? It’s worth thinking about.

Let’s begin with some foundation. If you can, read Dan Collins’ essay, “A Short Digression on the Meaning of Knowledge,” at *Lacunæ* 18 (June 2019): 79–93. To help with this I will send you the file. Then, please consider my short supplementary essay, “[A Brief Discussion of Kenosis](#).” That will introduce you to the “Gettier Table” that Collins uses to expand the thesis of Justified True Belief to cover eight sub-categories: knowledge, faith, resistance, ignorance, error, rumor, rationalization, and science. These are categories of human behavior as well as logical extensions of the JTB definition. Collins ends his essay by arguing variations on the idea that JTB is insufficient without *jouissance*. He tries adding E, for enjoyment, to parts of the formula as well as the whole formula. Justification of knowledge is not as important as the enjoyment of it: ETB (“ordinary knowledge”), and when psychoanalysis treats the troubled subject, E(JTB) is “cure.” The fact that it is never enough for the Analysand to know what is wrong with him/her, it is necessary for Analysis to be an experience of enjoyment that “takes things over the top.”

Figure 1. The JTB of knowledge (something true that is also believed/ believable and justifiable) expands to seven other “variations on the theme,” but each sub-variant tells its own story. Faith, for example depends on Truth, whether the truth is actual or not. Resistance is the refusal to believe in what is true and justifiable.

In the course of analysis, symptoms appear as encrypted messages calling for deciphering. The J, justification, becomes a code-book to understand why the Analysand enjoys believing in something: J(EB). Collins: “[T]he symptom in analysis that calls for decipherment is a justified enjoyed belief” (90). The Analyst must take the blah blah blah of the Analysand and find, amidst the chains of S_2S , a master signifier, S_1 . This is an empty signifier, something without content but great organization skills. It’s the MacGuffin of the Hitchcock film that makes no sense but allows the audience to justify whatever else is happening. Without it the blah blah blah would just be babble. With the discovery of the master signifier, it’s possible to do without the Justification and simply enjoy belief: J(EB)→EB. “Enjoyed belief” is the way James Joyce writes, and we read, *Finnegans Wake*. The gobbledy-gook text becomes enjoyable, although we can’t justify it and the truth of it is out of the question, it works only as being fictional, a pure project of the imagination. It’s a *sinthome* — a symptom that has no need of an explanation, but is simply to be enjoyed. Collins ends with a quote from Freud who, writing to Sandor Freneczi, claims “A man should not strive to eliminate his complexes but to get into accord with them: they are legitimately what directs his conduct in the world.”

Experiment

Let me try something to broaden this idea of “directing conduct in the world,” via *jouissance*. Look again at the table that I call the “Gettier Field.” I have converted Collins’ plusses and minuses into 1’s and 0’s to show how a binary order can be “counted” from the binary number (111, decimal equivalent to 7) back to zero, 000, with 6 as 110, 5 as 101, 4 as 100, 3 as 011, 2 as 010, 1 as 001, and zero appropriately as 000.

This binary conversion makes it easy to see that there are three terms that are “one step away” from full membership to JTF: Faith (110, believed to be true but not justifiable), Resistance (101, the refusal to believe what is both true and justifiable), and Error (011, the justification of belief in something that is not true).

There is another group of terms that manage only one “hit” on the JTB scale: Ignorance (100, something is true, but ignored by belief or justifications) and rationalization, 001: this is the “fast talker who can justify anything and doesn’t actually believe what he/she is saying.” Science, 000, is something of a special case. Science must *repudiate* belief in the name of objectivity and must not use reasons to justify what is not observed and tested to be true. This is Carl Popper’s famous *modus tolens* definition of science as a kind of skepticism: the principle of falsifiability. A fact that can’t be disproven can’t be tested, and everything in science must be tested before it is realized to be true. Of course this is not what happens in actual science made by actual scientists, who slip into justificationalism at the deep level of paradigms (this is the basis of Thomas Kuhn’s famous critique of Popper, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*). Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend went further, not so much to discredit the *modus tolens* as to suggest that it failed to capture science’s use of the imagination, its substance as a cultural artifact, or the need to use science as advocacy.

There is an important Lacanian point to be made here, however. The 000 could be considered as the starting point for a project of pure *jouissance*, the “ersatz conjecture.” This uses a principle we’ve run into in Seminar XIV: *ex falso quodlibet sequitur*, or “with a false premise, anything becomes possible.” This has been considered famously by Dostoevsky’s character in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Dmitri’s claim from his debate with Rakitin (as he reports it to Alyosha): “‘But what will become of men then?’ I asked him, ‘without God and immortal life?’ All things are permitted then, they can do what they like?”¹ It’s not a

¹ Slavoj Žižek, “If There Is a God, then Anything Is Permitted,” Religion and Ethics Portal, ABC; <https://www.abc.net.au/religion/if-there-is-a-god-then-anything-is-permitted/10100616>.

claim, it's a question. We know the answer from the sad fact that, in history, belief in God has been used to justify anything and everything. The logical proof of the *ex falso* argument (EFQ) uses steps where the proposition is divided into two parts, *either one of which* can be true to justify the next step.² This is almost a perfect definition of the way metonymy is used in parapraxis to go from one “wrong guess” about the name of the painter of the murals in the Orvieto Cathedral to another wrong guess. If $A \vee B$, and B is true, then the value of the whole expression $A \vee B$ is true. From Bosnia to Boltraffio to Trafei uses half of each name to enable a bridge between two terms that have nothing to do with each other otherwise. There is no part of Bosnia in Trafei, but the signifier HERR, translating SIGNORElli, lurks beneath as a mysterious ‘x’: $S_2 \dots S_2/x$, meaning that, in the chain of signifiers that is Freud’s parapraxis, the glue holding things together is this bridge function, the \vee that allows the whole expression to be judged as true if only one part of it is true. Basically, this means that a name *works* as long as it is a metonymy, and thus able to be bridged over to a term that is completely different, thanks to a term that contains a part from it, A, and a part of the other, B. The x is thus a \vee , and the *logic of the whole chaining process*.

As a logical relation, \vee , the x “does not exist” except as a process, a means, a conveyance function. It is a middle term in a syllogism that is pure reversal. This is the rhetorical syllogism, the enthymeme, where the speaker remains silent about the very thing he/she wants to convince others about. The silent middle, *sileo* rather than *taceo* as Lacan argues, the role of bridging will be *sileo*. Lacan: “The eternal silence of anything whatsoever, now only half scares us because of the appearance that science presents to common consciousness of positing itself as a knowledge which refuses to depend on language, without for all that this so-called consciousness being struck by this correlation: that it refuses at the same time to depend on the subject.” Science must *use* language but not depend on it. This is why logic must be *conscripted* into service, not in an affirming way but to *disavow* and *disconfirm* its relation to truth: 0, 0, and 0.

We see in the *modus tolens* principle that there is a pure state of disconfirmation and disavowal: the ersatz conjecture that begins its investigation *knowing that it is wrong*. This is the *ex falso*: 0, False. We don’t believe it, 0. But, when we attempt to justify it, $J = 0$, we do so in the name of the ersatz: that we don’t expect anything of it. With JTB cancelled, \cancel{JTB} , there is only one thing left: *enjoyment*. We “enjoy” the failure of the ersatz conjecture because it’s the only thing left to do. We cannot expect truth, we have given up the project of justification (there is no basis for the ersatz conjecture), and we definitely do not believe that the conjecture is in any way true: 000. Popper’s *modus tolens*, the 000 of science, is properly speaking the ersatz conjecture.

There is only one methodology for the ersatz conjecture, and that is the silencing of the connective middle term, \vee , so that a chain of signifiers can create a staircase where we will not know whether it goes up or down because it in fact goes in both directions at the same time: the top will be connected to the bottom because the \vee will be correct if only one part is true, so top \vee bottom will be bridged as long as there is a middle term that heads in two directions at the same time.³ What is the meaning of a “silent middle term”? The bridge between two metonymies is also a metonymy, so the answer must lie in the structure of the metonymy itself, and the way that a metonymy is both a connecting term and the terms that

² This double nature is also evident in the mathematical form of *ex falso*, the imaginary (e. g. non-existent) number, $\sqrt{-1}$, i , where the imagined product is +1 and -1. Lacan uses the \pm aspect notably in Seminar XIV when he devises the means of separating positive and negative powers of a in his slide-rule analogy.

³ The geometry that accommodates a vector that moves in two directions simultaneously is, of course, projective. This is the “cathetus” of the viewing point correlated to the vanishing point, which happens when perspectival perception is regarded as “happening in a mirror.” The cut of the mirror (proved by the chirality of the mirror that reverses left and right but *not* up and down) converts the vanishing point to an alternative viewing point, and *vice versa*. Perspective is thus “cononymic” in that the distance it pretends to create and represent is in fact intimacy, a perfect attunement of the vanishing point to the viewing point.

are being connected: a *mean and an extreme*: AB:CD. The unrelated terms, A and D, are the “extremes,” the bridge metonymy is BC. An example is simple: “The rancher counted forty head of cattle.” What does a cow have to do with a head? In the metonymic use of head to stand for each cow, it is the fact that the rancher is able to *see* the heads above the bodies and so uses the heads to count his herd. The head “stands out” from the body physiologically and linguistically. The behavior that ties cows to heads is the act of counting.

Metonymy also operates within the Gettier field. Fundamentally, the array of “mixed” JTB positions as a unit connects the two opposed positions, knowledge, 111, and science, 000. We can regard the field as a highly regulated version of Freud’s parapraxis, also a “field of signifiers” where the logic that converts one metonymy to the “silent position” of a bridge, \vee , allowing either term to be true for the whole expression to *flow* from the suppressed truth of Signorelli’s forgotten name to the remembered name. But, what was this truth to begin with? Lacan notes in Seminar V, *The Formations of the Unconscious*, that Freud suppresses “Signorelli” as HERR because *as a foreigner he sees what the native does not see*, namely the “signor” component of Signorelli. A native speaker would not pay the least attention to this element, and not think that the artist’s name had anything to do with the “sir” function, just as native English speakers do not think of carts or cart-makers when they hear the name “Cartwright” or an actual flour-grinder when they meet Mr. Miller.⁴

Lacan makes a point of grounding Freud’s parapractic adventure on his status as a tourist, a stranger in a strange land. This is silenced him in relation to the natives (the tourist is the neutralized non-citizen) but allowed him to see “latent cryptograms” contained within his itinerary. A tourist covers territory, so we must imagine this itinerary as a series of metonymical encounters. Freud has conversations, meets people he tells about his experience of forgetting, enjoys stories about Turks, runs into someone who tells him about an ex-patient who has committed suicide in a small village, Trafei. His linked metonymies map across the tourist domain. In effect they *are* a map, a map of forgetfulness, where the metonymy’s double service as a both a linking *and* linked term qualifies the signifying chain as a chord along which a knot slides from one end to another, akin to Dante’s famous rhyme schema, the *terza rima*, ABA, BCB, CDC ...⁵

What takes us back to the idea of *jouissance* as a supplement to knowledge is the fact of suppression, and suppression’s twinned result, parapraxis (the “map” of metonymies with the moving knot sliding along, flipping the binary switch at each step). Freud is not experiencing justified true belief when he forgets Signorelli’s name, but he is enjoying a kind of pleasure when, in the course of his travels, his encounters are haunted by a mysterious “x” factor, Herr, that makes a map of unknowing, or rather *kenosis*: he knows but he doesn’t know. He “has” the “x” but only as a silent operator, a missing piece, a

⁴ This does not rule out the funny use of names, as famously the case in Charles Dickens’ apt choices, which are either onomatopoeic, as in “Serjeant Buzfuz” (*Dombey and Son*) or “Mr. Wopsle” (*Great Expectations*) or explicitly descriptive, as in Bayham Badger (*Bleak House*), both the animal and the act of badgering, or Master Bates (*Oliver Twist*). These names are funny because the novel’s art form allows us to expect names to be predictors or indices of some quality the author has imagined.

⁵ The double role played by each element, as both a part of the mean and extreme, is called “audioactive,” meaning that both a content or value *and* a place position alternate. A metonymy is both signifier and signified, linking and linked, silent and voiced. Audioactivity, allowing for this double use, points to a “deep code” that, as suggested by the numerical version of audioactivity (11 as “one of 1”) points to a constant value (the Conway Constant in the case of numerical audioactivity). Audioactivity is not just the process by which the Fibonacci numbers, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 ... are created, where each number is a sum of the previous two numbers and subsequently a part of the next addition, but also the means of superimposing duplicate lines and “jogging” them one position left or right, will give successively more accurate measures of the value of \emptyset . Audioactivity is the simultaneous function of George Spencer-Brown’s cut-operator, when it is defined as both a distinction and an indication, an “instruction to cross” (into a space) and a call, a demand. See George Spencer-Brown, *Laws of Form* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969).

puzzle. Freud's *jouissance* is that he can't remember, but there is, in his search from something true that he can believe in and justify, and this 011, error, *ex falso*, is sheer enjoyment.

In other words, the *ex falso* of Freud's parapraxis, where we have allowed suppression to turn the 1 to 0 thanks to Freud's "seeing what he should not have seen," the *signor* in Signorelli, showed that Freud himself was a 1 to 0 fellow, zeroed by the circumstance of travel into a passive observer, an admirer of the travel spectacle, a foreign ghost. The spectacle can do that to a fellow. Its beauty paralyzes. The body is held in thrall at the same time the spirit is quickened in equal measure. This is literally the case in the Stendhal Syndrome, where great beauty overwhelms the nervous system and induces shock, fainting, and even occasionally death.⁶ As a zero, Freud's touristic passivity exposed him, willingly, to overwhelming experiences. By definition, the tourist is the equivalent of the hero, whose passivity has been famous since ancient times.⁷ From a 1 to a 0, belief (acceptance of the passive status of tourism) and justification (the travel itinerary) amount to the *jouissance* that is tourism's required expectation of delight: E(JBT). Travel, more than any other mode of human experience, exposes *jouissance* for what it is: a replacement part.

... A replacement part *on the condition of* the tourist's occupation of that interval special to the deace, the hero, and the architect, namely the labyrinthine ichnography of "between the two deaths." The question is, if enjoyment is the basis for Freud's itinerary, which in effect maps the links of the metonymical chain of signifiers to travel locations, then there is an isomorphy between the "demand" (the form by which metonymy addresses an Other with a lack, *a*, the forgetting of the name Signorelli) and the plane across which the Other is distributed as a travel landscape, whose essence is the labyrinth, the classic emblem of the interval of mourning, "between the two deaths."

Much is known about the cultural version of the interval. It is celebrated as the soul's wandering from the point of its literal death to a rest, a Symbolic death. It is not enough to die. The human subject must be "decommissioned" from the system of symbolic relations that had defined it, given it a life within language and customs, a *bios*, in addition to, and often in conflict with, its "raw life," its *zoē*.⁸ It is not enough to die as a physical body, it is necessary to die as a Symbolic person, and the difference between the two is traditionally configured as a pathway, an ichnography, a single corridor that is folded on itself three times — the number of completion, as indicated by the association of 3 with *trés*, tridents, and theological triplicity — to create a fractal obscurity miniaturizing the problem of continence/incontinence as a bi-directional vector. If the wanderer in the labyrinth pauses, moving again requires the *belief* that the direction is proper, despite evidence by the alternating centrifugal and centripetal folds, that confuse the issue. The labyrinth's *justification* confuses the traveler's *belief*, delaying the goal of the "moment of *truth*." The interval between the two deaths is a picture of the JTB; the moment of doubt is its *jouissance*, because it distills enjoyment's +/- essence as ecstasy in the doubt whether one is going in or out, *despite the evidence*.

⁶ A Stendhal instance served as the opening of Paolo Sorrentino's 2013 film, appropriately titled *The Great Beauty*. A Japanese tourist visiting Rome steps to a balustrade on the Janiculum to photograph the panorama below and is overwhelmed. The Stendhal Syndrome, a well-documented medical condition, involves the over-reaction of the vagus nerve, which itself is a wanderer, covering every part of the body "vaguely," ready to mobilize or immobilize in relation to an external threat or attraction.

⁷ Erwin Cook, " 'Active' and 'Passive' Heroics in the 'Odyssey,'" *The Classical World*, Vol. 93, No. 2, Homer (November–December, 1999): 149–167.

⁸ Giorgio Agamben has made this contrast famous, thanks to his *Homo Sacer*, the legal condition of the outcast; but unfortunately the relation of *bios* and *zoē* to the interval between the two deaths, a universal ethnographical observance, is overshadowed with the power politics of the condition of "raw life." See Sarah K. Hanson, "Zoē, Bios and the Language of Biopower," Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 2010. https://ir.vanderbilt.edu/bitstream/handle/1803/13492/Hansen_DissertationFinal.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.




Figure 2. Lacan uses the standard polygon of the torus (as a projective surface) in conjunction with the familiar do-nut of the torus as the 2-d form is “immersed” in 3-space. The polygon shows the logic of folding which is impossible in 3-space, but the do-nut can be cut to reveal this impossibility if the knife is twisted during its 360° circuit, revealing two interlinked Möbius bands. With repetition indicated at the upper right and suppression at the lower left, the Act outside the Symbolic (upper left) constructs a horizon with the acting-out within the Symbolic. The torus thus “turns itself inside-out,” a case of Lacanian *extimité*, intimate objectivity: “the truth is out there.” Truth is thus “that which is out there.” The architectural labyrinth presents a literal pathway that constructs this “truth as externality.”

The truth of the situation, T or 1, becomes 0 (and F), thanks to this hesitation. A geometric account of this situation can be represented graphically: \rightarrow or \leftarrow becomes \leftrightarrow , the bi-valent vector that is the hallmark of the real projective plane, the 2-d manifold of projective geometry, whose properties of self-intersection and non-orientation find their cultural counterparts in the idea of the soul that must (passively) submit to trials before completing the circle (the line of travel, for every tourist, must return home). E(JTB) is a clear statement of the *jouissance* of travel, under the condition demonstrated by Freud’s parapraxis, namely that travel is equivalent to the *passage à l’acte* of “between the two deaths.” The Act is the simultaneity of completion with circling, where returning to the origin point is the non-orientation of the coincidence of origin and end, birth with death, death as a *re-birth*.⁹ The *ex falso* (EFQ) principle boils down to the necessity by which *jouissance* is added to knowledge, *under the condition of the negated subject*, which we represent in all other conditions as $\$$. That is to say, the bar of the barred subject, S, is the negation of *jouissance* that joins the suppression (of a name, in Freud’s case of parapraxis) with repetition (the metonymical “demands” that map the space of travel) as a case of “between the two deaths.” The torus by which Lacan connects repetition with suppression, *via* the Act and acting-out, makes this connection clear through its standard polygon,

whose bi-colored vectors represent the logic of metonymy’s staircase bridge between the literal death (the void at the lower left corner) to symbolic death (the repetitions that return the traveler “home,” back to the father land.

Truth is, in its self-negation (voluntary passive subjection to suffering) and non-orientation (the labyrinth), *jouissance*. To truth as a state is added the obligation to travel: Plato’s moving image of eternity (*Timeus*).

Further Thinking

Look again at the Gettier Table (Fig. 1). There are conditions with only one “0”: Faith (110) cannot Justify the Truth it Believes in. Resistance (101), refuses to Believe the Truth that is easily Justified (this is the basis of Analysis’s frontal attack on the Analysand’s denials: “I definitely am not in love with my mother!”). Error (011) firmly Believes in, and Justifies its conviction that the false is true (think election deniers).


The low-scorers on the Gettier matrix are Ignorance (100), Rumor (010), and Rationalization (001), where Truth, Belief, and Justification become islands defended against all odds. Here we realize the connection between *jouissance* and defense. The subject constructs an enemy, and despite the actual empirical reality of the enemy, the subject is nonetheless paranoid. Only an invented enemy can have

⁹ Non-orientation is not tolerated within the Symbolic, which protects itself through the master signifier, the Paternal Signifier. Thus, the employment of the interval between the two deaths must be fantasized in the customs of mourning, celebrating the “restful conclusion” of the soul received into heaven, arbitrarily defined as also the ending of the period of mourning.

powers proper to the subject's need to survive, and this is the essence of the death drive, that the threat of death is the meaning of life, *life as survival against* this threat. There is no difference between *jouissance* and the death drive. They are one and the same. This is clear in the way subjective intensity is applied with even greater force when the odds are against it, as in the cases of Ignorance, Rumor, and Rationalization. The less intense cases of Faith, Resistance, and Error allow *jouissance* to be domesticated as institutions: religion, the political opposition/contrariness of conservatism, and the countless cases that spring from the *ex falso* condition of the O11, where "everything is possible as long as God exists (but we know He does not)."

Vico saw through this condition of error, of *ex falso*, when he argued that metaphor is the fundamental *ex falso* from which the human *quodlibet* sprang forth in its form, the "ideal eternal history." But, metaphor was not simply a poetic fancy of physical substances animated by divine forces and personalities. It was the simultaneity of suppression with repetition, the replacement of a signifier by another (human nature by Jove's thunder, in Vico's fable of origins) with the original institution of ritual divination, metonymically elaborated into foundation rites, burial, marriage, and Law. All of these embedded a principle of paralysis that called for imposture. The absolute fixity of the first altars and hearths was qualified by transferring earth from one site to another. The incarceration of daughters as "priestesses of Hestia" at the household hearth was supplied with the work-around of involuntary abduction, "the Rape of the Sabines" being the most evident example. The implacable absolutism of divination was, Vico argued, extended as a consequence of the principle of asylum, extending the authority of religion beyond the family to the clan, then to the tribe, then to the nation. Asylum is ambiguously a fortress and a prison, and anxiety over which is which condenses this problem on the bivalent meaning of the boundary, which in our times is the famous problem of the wall that, though impossible, must be built. At the same time the alien must be excluded the natives must be suppressed, in particular the "priestesses of Hestia." Political *jouissance* works as an automaton, "knowing without knowing" but able to reproduce its irrationality *ad infinitum*. This is the trifecta of Ignorance, Rumor, and Rationalization that, in possession of its "one value," regards itself as isolated but in fact is self-imprisoned. This ultimate self-annihilation compresses *jouissance* to the point of fission, and it can only imagine itself as an explosion (civil war, apocalypse, sacrificial death of the hero).

We do not have to intellectualize *jouissance*, we must suffer the historical reality of it. But, in case we want to see the devices by which human subjectivity is self-imprisoning, self-annihilating, self-negating, we must understand *jouissance* in the way Lacan argued that it was the basis of the Freudian death drive, both a maniacal headlong plunge into nothingness AND the all-out struggle against disappearance. Here the question is "disappearance from the look of the Other," in whose eyes fantasy representations of this dominates, suppresses, conditions. It from the infant's autoeroticism, the by the desire to survive against the in the Other. With this paranoid the world, and regard the reflections world's existence. *Ex falso quodlibet*



what," and the Lacanian answer is we must appear as wretched. In the fantasy representation, this gaze is the basis of the ego that emerges ego that is driven to strengthen itself threat that is paranoiacally embodied structure we can invest feelings in of this investment as proof of the *sequitur*, world without end, Amen.