

The Importance of Ethnology

a short essay on the necessity of grounding study in cultural practices

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(for Cami, Marion, Negar, and Paul)

In Paul Ricœur's essay "Architecture and Narrativity," examples given for both architecture and narrative are drawn from an assumed everyday experience, an imagined common trove of ideas of what these things are. The Heideggerian generality about dwelling and building grounds Ricœur's immediate image of contemporary towns with buildings. Specific examples would perhaps not be helpful, but it is that Ricœur believes that the general picture will be shared by everyone, a common repository. "[T]he house and the town are contemporary in essential inhabiting-building" (34) and, although he cites "so-called 'primitive' humankind," references are generalized and modern in the sense of "images available to all." A natural attitude is also evident with respect to narrative, where "conversational narrative is not limited to an exchange of memories, but is coextensive with journeys from place to place." Narrative's implicit spatiality is put on hold, however, for the reduction of architecture to space and shrinkage of narrative to time that will guide the subsequent thought experiment.

How would a reference to ethnology, a study of cultural practices stretching from the earliest human times to popular culture examples of the present day, improve this essay? What does ethnology offer? Is it an optional appendage of critical scholarly thinking? What would make it essential? These questions pivot around a central issue. Is any atom of human behavior, thought, or imagination dynamic or static, and in what proportion?

Giambattista Vico provided an answer to this question that is, in the history of thought, virtually unique. It is an answer that requires a paradoxical combination of dynamics and stasis, so even those who have studied Vico's work sympathetically have regarded it to be a problem rather than a solution.¹ If Vico's *primary* genius idea is not recognized by Vichian specialist, what hope might there be for more general recognition or understanding of the principle of

¹ Footnote from "Metaphor and Scene-Blocking": Sandra Rudnick Luft, "Hans Blumenberg's Use of Verum/Factum: A Vichian Perspective," *New Vico Studies* 5 (1987): 149–150; see also Luft, "The Legitimacy of Hans Blumenberg's Conception of Originary Activity," *Annals of Scholarship* 5, 1 (Fall 1987). Luft identifies a major rift in Vichians who either understand or do not understand Vico's principle of the simultaneity of the successive and the contemporaneous. See her *Vico's Uncanny Humanism: Reading the New Science between Modern and Post-Modern* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University, 2003), 154. Luft notes that even a prominent Vico scholar, Gianfranco Cantelli, regards Vico's merger of the successive and the contemporaneous as an "apparent inconsistency." See Gianfranco Cantelli, "Reflections on the Vichian Thesis That the Original Language of Humanity was a Language Spoken by the Gods," *New Vico Studies* 11 (1993): 1–12.

“successive+contemporaneous” that is the basis of Vico’s “ideal eternal history”² Will we instead be forced to accept the “natural attitude” that reduces architecture to space and narrativity to time, when the evidence of culture presents us with “solutions” already put into place under the heading of liminality?

Rather than argue this point negatively, in terms of those who have misunderstood or misrepresented this important cultural dyad, I would like to revive Victor Turner’s studies of liminality, which broadened and intensified Arnold van Gennep’s original work on the “rites of passage.” I see Turner’s work as the sweetest and roundest fruit of the tradition that arose in the early 1900s around Sir James Frazer’s *Golden Bough*, where classicists, historians, and anthropologists joined forces to see, within the mass of materials gathered by anthropologists, explorers, archaeologists, missionaries, and explorers about “primitive peoples” still extant in parts of the globe on the margins of known territories. In the 19c. such studies were grouped under the heading of “philology,” beginning with studies of primitive languages. It’s telling that the two most famous figures in this field were brothers, albeit of strikingly different temperaments: Alexander von Humboldt, the explorer and geographer, and his philologist brother, Wilhelm. In the search for the headwaters of Western languages, Wilhelm von Humboldt studied Basque and Kawi (spoken in Java) but his main theoretical work, *The Heterogeneity of Language and its Influence on the Intellectual Development of Mankind* (1836) argued for more general principles and was regarded by some such as Ernst Cassirer as the origin of modern philology.

Out of philology grew anthropology, sharpened by the growing collection of artifacts looted from native cultures. It would be impossible to underestimate the significance of this influx of artworks, many of them key components of rituals and shrines, on western art. Masks, costumes, textiles in general, and in some cases dance and music (think Josephine Baker in Paris) revolutionized European thinking, which had up to that point been referencing its own primitivism, as in Aubrey Beardsley’s, Hector Grimard’s, and Victor Horta’s *arts nouveaux*, grounded in the arabesques of textual margins, existing since the Late Middle Ages.

How is it that philology, still widely regarded as a category of contemporary theory, is given rough or limited treatment in architecture theory? The Cambridge Circle led to Structuralism, Structuralism led to narratology, and narratology led to semiology. What allowed studies such as *Primitive: Original Matters in Architecture* to escape the mention of any of these subjects, to say

² Giambattista Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1948). Direct references to the “ideal eternal history” (*storia ideale eterna*) can be found in §§ 7, 18, 35, 114, 145, 245, 294, 349, 393, 915, 1004. Ricoeur’s own ideal eternal combination of architecture-as-space and narrativity-as-time is presented as a theoretical construct, and he also seems to believe, as in his reference to Proust (34), that there is a primitive composite analogous to Vico’s. Paul Ricoeur, “Architecture and Narrativity,” *Ricoeur Studies* 7, 2 (2016): 31–42, DOI 10.5195/errs.2016.378.

nothing of references to liminality?³ A short answer is that such omissions are not flagged because the reviewers employed by publishers do not know that they are omissions. Architecture publishing does not stray far outside its own circle of self-referencing, self-congratulating, and self-confirming scholarship. If such books were read by non-architects, they would be ridiculed.

There is no general hope of restoring liminality and the ideal of successive+contemporaneous that was for Vico an originating concept belong to the ingenuity of cultures themselves and for Ricoeur a personally brilliant and original intellectual accomplishment. No writers would write of correcting this backwards imbalance, and no reviewers would approve of it; hence, no publishers would publish it. It is up to the independent scholar to assimilate the idea and its associated problems and issues, to perform what Gaston Bachelard called *la surveillance intellectuelle de soi*, a self-regulating series of reality checks by which speculation is either confirmed or disconfirmed both by philosophical necessity and by, and within, ethnology/ethnography, in relation to one's own thinking: the history of the past, as succession, as a mirror of one's "contemporaneous" subjectivity. In other words, the search for the dyad in culture "out there" involves applying it to the search itself, in relation to the searcher her or himself. There could be no clearer definition of phenomenology than this "reflection on reflection," which is articulated in Maurice Merleau-Ponty's consideration of "Cezanne's Doubt."⁴ Does not Cezanne's doubt apply to all of us?

There is no hope that architecture theorists will read, to say nothing of understand, Vico or, outside a small circle of devoted admirers, Lacan. There is no stomach for tackling most serious foundational texts: Hegel, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Spinoza, Plato. Aristotle is admitted because possibly of the accessibility of his logical constructs (the logical square, the four causes, etc.), but Plato's subtle Socrates is lost on scholarship intent on "finding the main ideas." When Donald Verene articulated his thesis that Vico's main idea was not the *verum ipsum factum* but, rather the "imaginative universal," there was no general interest in this novel theory of metaphor, and even architecture's foremost Vichian, Marco Frascari, held to the *verum factum* as Vico's cosmic center.⁵ There is to date no one in architecture theory who has scratched the surface of the

³ The words "liminality" and "cyclopean" cannot be found, for example, in the representative collection of contemporary architecture writing on the primitive, *Primitive: Original Matters in Architecture*, ed. Jo Odgers, Flora Samuel, and Adam Sharr (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Neither do the names Vico, Turner, van Gennep, Frazer, Harrison, Levi, Dodds, or any other of the "Cambridge Circle" appear even once. Architecture theory is keen on constructing its own narratives around cherished artifacts: Vitruvius's primitive hut, Laugier's review of that, Semper's essays. There will be nothing further, or any more authentically ethnological to worry about, even when scholars as thoughtful as Nicholas Temple, in "Giants and Columns," address giantism directly and daring to quote Hesiod on the Golden Age (139). Despite Vico's pointed use of giantism as the essence of metaphoric transfer, architecture theory knows nothing of this account, which explains the key relation between scale and sublation, which Lacan would take up later in his own theory of metaphor.

⁴ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Cezanne's Doubt," in *Sense and Nonsense*, trans. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, 1971). A full text is available on-line at https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/christianmieves/files/2020/03/Merleau-Ponty-Maurice-Sense-and-Nonsense_Cezanne.pdf

⁵ Other scholars would actually convert Vico's text to fit their own (non-Vichian) theses about the polemical ease of applying mythic thinking in modern times.

verum factum as Vico applied it, not just to the ancient Italian culture but to himself, in the specific conception of his *New Science*.⁶

Liminality as the Kernel of Ethnology

What is the logic of cultures, if not the drawing of boundaries and demarcation of territories (the house, the hearth, the ancient burial field, the ancient city built on top of the burial field⁷) and rituals set up to allow crossing them? What would culture be without the adaptation of these crossing protocols to the temporal passages of life: from childhood to adulthood, from unmarried to married, from life to death? Liminality is the condition of all change in the human world, and the lively exchange between the physical and spiritual that defines these changes is embodied in the customs associated with Arnold van Gennep's original expression, "the rites of passage."⁸

Even modern studies, such as Marc Augé's *Non-places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* are reluctant to apply this stolen idea correctly, as a clear case of "successive+contemporaneous." What has become of the anthropology of the descent theme, the *katabasis*, the journey heroes were obliged to undertake to access the truth of their ancestors and given the privilege to return alive, usually to found a city? What do modern architectural theorists think of Book VI of *The Aeneid*, where just such a journey takes place, and where the shape of this journey is compared to the Thesean labyrinth, both as a spatial and a narrative construct? Are these simply missed opportunities?

If liminality is the kernel of ethnographical practices and, by extension, culture itself; and if liminality is simultaneously architectural (at its most intensive) and narratological; why would we not hear more about it? Not only was Vico's *New Science* about liminality, the text itself was deliberately constructed as a liminal masterwork. Margharita Frankel has demonstrated that Vico's text was not simply repetitious and circular, it was intentionally written to simulate the

⁶ Most errors of interpreting Vico's major work stem from the fact that Vico, writing under the heavy terrorism of the Spanish Inquisition, could not write anything even remotely against Christianity. Yet, Vico managed to play the "unreliable narrator" through rhetorical devices to allow his thesis of ancient humans' paganism to shine through. Although Vico called this a "false religion," it was in the sense of the principle of *ex falso quodlibet sequitur*, a falsehood (of the metaphoric transposition of the viewer's qualities to external nature) that led to the formation of the human world as such. By continually contrasting this metaphoric mentality to the "true, revealed" religion of the Jews and Christians, Vico avoided prison and censorship, but many of his modern readers take his protesting-too-much seriously and cast him as a devout Christian, despite the biographical evidence that he was, if anything, an apostate or outright atheist. However, Vico believed that religion, which began as Varro said in fear, was in fact precisely the dynamic formation of the divine that made it "truly" divine and not an imposed symbolism. Just as Judaism and Islam forbid direct representations of nature, the truth is that these religions themselves are overtly and covertly symbolic, in the Lacanian and Vichian sense of Law. Another image would be in competition to the (non-)image of the invisible deity that nonetheless is everywhere and nowhere, as opposed to the ancient gods of the pagans, who were anywhere, grounded in contingency.

⁷ I would cite the work of Paul Wheatley, *The Pivot of the Four Quarters: A Preliminary Enquiry into the Origins and Character of the Ancient Chinese City* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1971), which compares all seven sites of urban emergence, noting that all begin at sites previously used for burial.

⁸ Arnold van Gennep, *Les rites de passage* (Paris: Émile Nourry, 1909).

form and effects of the Cretan Labyrinth.⁹ Not only did Vico claim that cultures cycled and re-cycled, his claim was itself an example of this process, with the idea in mind that the reader, in undertaking it, would experience the truths of culture directly.

§345 Thus the proper and consecutive proof here adduced will consist in comparing and reflecting whether our human mind, in the series of possibilities it is permitted to understand, and so far as it is permitted to do so, can conceive more or fewer or different causes than those from which issue the effects of this civil world. *In doing this the reader will experience in his mortal body a divine pleasure as he contemplates in the divine ideas this world of nations in all the extent of its places, times and varieties.* And he will find that he has in effect convinced the Epicureans that their chance cannot wander foolishly about and everywhere find a way out, and the Stoics that their eternal chain of causes, to which they will have it the world is chained, itself hangs upon the omnipotent, wise and beneficent will of the best and greatest God. [emphasis mine]

In other words, Vico's book about liminality rests its case on the physical result of a rite of passage, done through the medium of his text. It would be hard to find a case where an author puts as much faith in the truth of that which he/she researches. Vico is saying that the object of our study, historical *succession*, must be re-connected to our study methods, our own manner of comprehending the truths of this succession, i. e. our *contemporaneous* mental discovery. This is the meaning of Vico's epithet, found in *De antiquissima Italorum sapientia* (1710), *verum ipsum factum*. We study the *factum*, the sum-total of the products of history, and find in it the truth, *il vero*, that will join our study to the thing we study, as two simultaneous phenomena.

The key here is "sum-total." Vico's and van Gennep's inventories are original concept, and to name them in order to compare them I will borrow a term from mathematics: "the Hamiltonian." This is the name for the sum total of all energies that create a circuit, but because the Hamiltonian includes latent along with manifest and even negative along with positive energies, it's the perfect term to use when things like the *verum factum* are involved. The Hamiltonian inventories the good, bad and ugly, to the point that the circuit it is measuring seems to be either layered or multiple circuits. If the term Hamiltonian had been around when Freud attempted to name the forces that complicated the simplistic search for pleasure and avoidance of pain, he would have done better than the unfortunate term he coined in 1920, the "death drive" (*Todestrieb*).¹⁰

The Hamiltonian is the abstract global term for this *mixage* of the consecutive and contemporaneous; it is useful to have something to call instances when the principle of the Hamiltonian is incarnated locally. I would suggest "the Escher" or "the Escher construct," on behalf of the clever staircases devised by this Dutch illustrator to go up and down simultaneously. Just as Vico described ancient Italian words that meant opposite things, and just as Freud was attracted to the thesis of Carl Abel about the predominance of such words in antiquity, the Escher construct is, in language, the "contronym" and, in architecture, the Thesean Labyrinth or, more

⁹ Margherita Frankel, "The *Dipentura* and the Structure of Vico's 'New Science' as a Mirror of the World, *Vico: Past and Present*, ed. Giorgio Tagliacozzo (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1981), 43–51.

¹⁰ Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* 18 (1920):1–64.



Figure 1. Otto van Veen in his *Amoris divini emblemata* (1615). *Mons Delectus*, or “mountain of choices” cutting, like the Tower of Babel, through the liquid layer of clouds. This emblem represents architecture’s Hamiltonian as a dyad of temple and labyrinth: a sum total of the energies of suppression and expression involved in any full expression of architectural intent.

generally, the way that the idea of the temple and the labyrinth are *simultaneous* in such examples as the Tower of Babel and Table of Cebes (Fig. 1).

To say all there is to say isn’t a matter of extending a work infinitely or almost infinitely. Rather, it’s the project of finding the balance point where continuation may be automated. Imagine a line assigned a unit length. On that line will be a point where the ratio of $1/a$ will be the same as the ratio of $1 + a/1$. This point will define all the ratios that continue “above” it, to create longer lines, and all those “below” it, that will divide the 1 into perfectly proportioned relations.

This is the famous Fibonacci series, 1 1 2 3 5 8 13 ..., which has the palindromic capability of estimating its own numerical value iteratively, with an accuracy that increases as the fractions continue: $2/1$, $3/2$, $5/3$, $8/5$, etc. Iteratively, the point a on the line of the unit constitute a “Escheristic” place to stop, a means of completing a Hamiltonian inventory.

Vico had to conclude the *New Science* somewhere, in some way. How did it choose to do it? If we consider the history behind the frontispiece Vico inserted into the 1725 edition, we get an interesting answer. Vico

had been corresponding with the architectural theorist, Carlo Lodoli, who had promised to support the publication of this edition of *The New Science*. Lodoli, however, withdrew at the last moment, leaving Vico with the burden of paying for the printing himself. He wrote a scathing account of Lodoli’s behavior but friends persuaded him to withdraw this letter for political considerations (Lodoli was a rich and influential Venetian intellectual who could have ruined Vico’s reputation). This left the printer with a number of blank pages to fill. Vico (he claims) got the bright idea to introduce his work with an image, and he compared his image, known as the *dipintura*, to the image famous across European academia known as “Cebes Table” (Fig. 1 also). The story of this image is relevant. Cebes Table was supposedly the image hanging in the back of a temple visited by a pilgrim. It was said to show, in a single picture, the *whole truth* of the world — indeed, a Hamiltonian claim! The priest of the temple warned the pilgrim of the curse that protected the image. If one looked at it and did not understand it, one would go mad. However, if one understood it, the image would confer absolute wisdom.

With this backstory in mind, Vico devised a similar emblem (Fig. 2), but omitted the dire warning. Instead, he promised the reader of *The New Science* that the frontispiece would work as a



Figure 2. The *dipintura* or frontispiece of Giambattista Vico's *New Science* (1725), showing the divine eye reflected off of the mirror-face of a jewel on the breast of *Metafisica*, perched on top of a celestial sphere balanced on the edge of the first human altar, where the sacraments of fire and water are ready for rituals of divination, marriage, and burial. The divine ray is reflected onto the statue of the blind Homer, who presides over an array of objects representing human institutions. The helmet of Hermes at the lower left, is unmentioned in Vico's inventory although Homer seems to gesture in its direction.

study guide, and he helpfully annotated it, describing each and every item shown. Briefly, the image tells the story of the first humans who, at the first instant of metaphoric thinking, opened up a clearing in the forest to see the blue sky (*caelum* means both “heaven” and “axe,” Vico tells us in his *Autobiography*), so that they could interpret signs of the sky at a local altar, where the rituals of fire and water would purify the poet-kings taking the auspices and applying them to the first principal institutions, marriage and burial. This “stolen fire” localized the totalized order of the cosmos, and thus was the first case of the Hamiltonian applied to the *locale* of the Escher construct.

Of course, Vico left out one object from his otherwise complete inventory of the *dipintura*, the Helmet of Hermes, located on the left corner beneath the statue of Homer's right hand. Was this an accident? In my conjecture about this image, I argue that the divine eye was meant to work as a keyhole through which a viewer would see the frontispiece in a mirror, while holding it by the right corner, reversed as the left edge because the viewer would have to reverse the image to see it in the mirror. This transfer of the helmet of Hermes from viewed to viewer would accomplish the transfer of the “divine” idea of *The New Science* from Vico to the reader. “The Hamiltonian” would be accomplished by including the reader as part of the text, the viewer as part of the viewed. The Escher function would be the mechanism, the “dispositif” to use Bachelard's term, to actualize this totalizing function. In keeping with

Bachelard's concept of *la surveillance intellectuelle de soi*, the helmet of Hermes completes the picture by being both a part and not a part of it: visible but unmentioned in Vico's otherwise complete inventory annotating every *other* visible component. This, plus the theory that the *dipintura* was set up to be seen in a mirror, completes my argument that Vico's trick image design was also the logic behind *The New Science* as a whole, where, in paragraph 345, he compares the reader to the pilgrim in a labyrinth.

The Case of the Missing Cyclops

If the idea of completion without saying everything can be compared to a dot on a line of unit length, then Vico's frontispiece is this dot. It “Escherizes the Hamiltonian” by the iterative procedure of self-reference, which is both a self-intersection and a non-orientation. The text and

reader are inversions, just as the viewer and the viewed are opposite sides and opposite logics of the single instance of perception. Every polarized encounter of the subject with the world involves just such a partition, a juxtaposition of one thing and its opposite. Could we extend this formula to love/hate, life/death, beginning/end? Another way of putting this would be to say “How can we *not* describe these important “rites of passage” without reference to non-orientation? How are love and hate *not* both connected but opposite? How can there be a beginning with out the implicating of an end, or life without the mortal obligation to die? Entailment of an opposite, an equal, matching, but inverted twin, is the essence of human life. This connection and inversion is the essence of what makes Vico’s principle of succession coupled with the contemporaneous both true and paradoxical. The preponderance of such Hamiltonian/Escherian instances in human life makes us wonder why architecture theorists have purposefully avoided, misrepresented, or failed to notice this condition at all, let alone Vico’s or Lacan’s continued emphasis on it.¹¹

In the anthology, *Primitive*, there is nothing about this truly primitive, truly first, condition. We cannot dismiss this as simply bad scholarship. It is a symptom of a systematic blindness in the discipline of architecture to domesticate the primitive by insisting that it is remote, either culturally as when, like the Yānomamö of the Amazon basin, people are linguistically, technologically, and socially remote from the modern world, or when the question of origins can be located in the distant past. It is then inconceivable that the primitive is a part of the present world, at least not the world that is reading the book on the primitive.

This amounts to denying the role and impact of what Ernst Cassirer designated as the expressive function (*Ausdrucksfunktion*), the first “moments” of visceral encounter with the world of the senses, a moment that is quickly overtaken by a second moment, directed by consciousness and the interest of the ego, the representative function (*Darstellungsfunktion*), which imposes logical hierarchies and cause-and-effect relations. The transition is swift, and the expressive mode quickly gives way, unless there is something to resist assimilation. When the sensorium first apprehends a significant force or threat, the vagus nerve is in charge and capable of over-ruling the executive functions of the frontal cortex, the center of rational thought. Fainting, shock, or even death can be the result. Because each sense depends on a surface created by nerve tissue, the sensorium has the structure of a mirror, which is also a cut. The vagus nerve must be able to decide on its own whether the organism should flee or fight, a decision that will quickly be “authorized” by cognitive functions that attempt to take credit for this decision. The ego adds, to

¹¹ As an inventory idea, the Hamiltonian and Escher formation constitute a logic behind not just Vico’s ideal eternal history, but his writing strategy (to include the reader along with the writer), his theory of metaphor (including the viewer with the viewed, as a “non-orientable”), and his principle, borrowed from Mandeville (“the thesis of the bees”) that human avarice and cupidity are the basis for the opposite, the extension of concern for others and the creation of social equality. Everywhere Vico uses the logic, which originates in projective topology, of the non-orientable self-intersection. Even the phenomenon known as immersion, the extending of a projective form into 3-space, constitutes the part of his schema where paradox is experienced directly, in the phenomena of miracles, epiphanies, and events attributed to magic, including his own discovery of the principle of mythic thought, which he characterizes as an “ahah” moment after a “good twenty years” of effort.

the vagus nerve's lists of survival factors, the element of esteem, which can supplant more practical considerations. Heroism, associated with the representational function, converts the initial fight-or-flight consideration into a question of status and honor, overwriting other concerns.

It is easy to see in culture that most of what we call primitive life is a highly articulated system of esteem relations. Warfare is stylized and universalized; killing is integrated into beliefs about the soul, the relation of intelligence to the flesh, and of course the all-important matter of blood, which can be shared, ambiguously, by the earth and the spirits residing there. It is difficult for the modern mind to appreciate the delicacy of these early systems of systematic esteem, which have not yet fully detached from the *Ausdrucksfunktion*. Fundamentally, the first step away from the expressive is to attribute it to natural objects, to regard the sky, rivers, mountains, etc. with the passions actually felt by humans and reconfigure nature as a system of demonic causes and intentions. There is no mention of any of this in the book on the primitive, nor any study of Cassirer or Vico to be found in the world of architecture theory. Amazingly, the authors of this volume either do not know about the expressive function or do not regard it as relevant. How?

Why Has the Theory of Mourning Left Out the Matter of the Two Deaths?

The first and primary rite of passage is modeled on the *katabasis*, the descent into the underworld. Before the full assimilation of the expressive function by the representative function through the institution of formalized warfare, the word *hero* simply meant any dead person; only later did it come to designate the person willing to die in the cause of esteem. The third level of thought develops early, but it is not realized as conceptual, systematic abstraction but, rather, as wit. This is the thought of poets (bards), shamans, and magicians who, exempted from the culture of esteem or “immunized” by being its kings, managed the rituals of divination, accumulated and organized the findings of auspices using forms of writing and calculation, administered laws, mediated between factions, and preserved history in poetic structures. I say structures because the mnemonic system of the bards was not simply remembered speech. Its tropes and poetic devices themselves were encoded secretly, to be shared only with others familiar with the system.

In some cases, the poetic class would handle funerary functions, particularly when one burial site was used by multiple groups, as in the case of Rome, whose seven hills were occupied by seven different clans, all of whom used the marshy area that became the Roman forum as a common cemetery. The undertakers could speak all seven of the dialects of their constituents, organized trade and systems of exchange, mediated disputes, and of course handled funeral matters. Replacing the custom of burial within the house, collective burial relied on a commonly shared mythology of the soul's independent existence after death. The deceased was not dead at the moment of literal death, but continued, often unaware of the fact of dying, to the point of a second, symbolic death. This journey was mythologically embellished with trials and tasks — work that needed to be done to cleanse the soul from the “sticky” aspects of its mortal life, mainly

the sins and other failures that bound it to the idea of living — avarice, greed, gluttony, jealousy, ambition, etc. This filtering process aimed to purify the not-fully-deceased in preparation for a judgment allowing it to avoid the perpetual recycling of reincarnation which, from the point of view of the living survivors, was the threat of being haunted.

In other words, the families of the deceased relied on the poet-undertakers to insure that the dead relative would make it to the end of the process of dying and be truly and fully dead. As such, the dead person could be absorbed within a generalized spiritual construct, the *manes*, which could benefit and protect the household thanks to its prestigious location in Hades.

The second death was an institution of primitive thinking, but it continues to exist today, in the form ¹²of the idea of mourning, a period of time culturally set up on a “base 40” system, 40 being the number associated with insulation (cf. “quarantine”). Forty days, forty weeks, or forty months were some of the variations; whatever it took to give the wandering soul time to cleanse itself and become a household god, one of the *manes*. Because this interval involved the element of transgression and payment for sins, it was silently associated with shame and guilt: the shame of the deceased, which had to be expiated; and the guilt of the survivors for any possible related culpability. Mourning was thus not a simple matter of sadness over the loss of a loved one, but a complex matter of guilt and shame deprived of any access to the “facts of the case.” As generic, these feelings are, as Lacan put it, depression, even depression associated with mourning, was a “moral failing,” a withdrawal from the duty to be “well-spoken.”¹³

Such pronouncements were what got Lacan into trouble with non-Lacanian or even some Lacanians, since the meaning was entirely obscure. Some Lacanians have suggested that “well-spoken” has to do with the clever use of rhetoric. Employing a long list of rhetorical tropes (litotes, ellipses, pleonasm, ... ect.) the author, Owen Hewitson, at least identifies for us the one truth that makes sense in this question, namely, that rhetoric is always about a double use of language. On the level of literal words, there is the production of speech that can be described as content, an ordering of signifiers. On the level of style, however, there is a dimension directed at the listener which is about desire in relation to another. Thus, the rhetor, to use the extreme case, will say one thing with a clear literal meaning that is structured in order to get the listener to do the exact opposite thing. This may be an instruction to go home when the intention and final effect is to remain here, as the witty general in Homer’s *Iliad* was able to compose.

Rhetoric may also have the effect of other divisions of literal from intended meanings. If we trace back this division effect in history, we reach the paradigmatic case, oracular speech. The most famous example of this is the oracle at Delos, whose pronouncements were famously a case of what Lacan called *mi-dire*, saying things by halves. The oracle, seated on a tripod placed over a channel connected to an underground source of inebriating/trance-inducing gas (so it is said),

¹² Owen Hewitson, “What Does Lacan Have to Say about Rhetoric?” *Lacanonline.com*; <https://www.lacanonline.com/2010/08/what-does-lacan-say-about-rhetoric/>

¹³ Jacques Lacan, *Television*, trans. D. Hollier, R. Krauss, and A. Michelson (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1990).

would give answers to questions put to her by those who had made the appropriate payments. Her statements would always relate to the question, but in an open-ended way. In response to a general's desire to know who would win an upcoming battle, the oracle was said to conclude that "a great army will perish today." The general assumed that it would be his enemy's army, but it turned out to be his own.

Any statement can change its meaning with the addition of prepositions. "For (whom)" and "by (whom/what) show how leaving out the question of agent and agency, meaning can be permanently ambiguous. "For" as "on account of" can change entirely the motive and hence aim of why something is done. The oracle simply exploited language's innate capacity for double meaning. How does the "well-spoken" speech relate to mourning and the interval between the two deaths? What could it possibly have to do with the wandering of soul in ignorance that it is dead, encountering trials and tests in preparation for a final judgment releasing it from the cycle of rebirths?

We should look to the structure of the rhetorical double function, what makes speech able to say one thing and mean another. This function is present in all rhetorical figures, it is the constant feature, the guiding design. The break between the literal and the effective first shows that a break is possible. If we regard all speech as originally and implicitly rhetorical, even when we try to speak literally, then the break is also necessary. To speak is *implicitly* to introduce a cut in communications, which will be active and operative even when we try to suppress it. To be well-spoken implies that we have some control over this function and have been trained in its use. To be aware of what we are saying and how it effects others, our speaking-well requires this knowledge. Lacan and others would say this about language: it speaks us, we do not speak it. In every speech *act*, the universal functions and structures of language are being applied, often if not always without our conscious awareness.

The Pythoness of Delphi is one model of the speaker's passivity in relation to the more mysterious second — structural — voice of language, a language of virtualities, suppositions, and hidden axioms. This is the language we all speak, all the time, because the *cut* between intentional and rhetorical meaning is there whether we acknowledge it or not. If I say "the door is open" to someone, indicating that I did not lock it, my listener may understand that I am giving permission to do something we were talking about earlier. To speak well in this case, I would have to know how to use this ambiguity. Like the Pythoness, I allow the receiver of the message to interpret it to his own *liking*, which means that responsibility for interpretation always lies with the recipient's relation to the imagined Other of the message. "Well-meaning" is about the cut, the rhetorical ambiguity of all meaning, a relation to the authority of the Other.

Topologically, the interval between the two deaths, the literal death and symbolic death, corresponds to the rhetorical interval in language between literal meaning and other possible meanings. Just as the ghost of the deceased is present by being absent, the ghost of rhetorical meaning is present by the fact that it is not presented literally, but "haunts" what is said. Rhetoric




Figure 3. The labyrinth as a fractal design of three ABA cycles containing smaller cycles within. The concentric $A_{ABA}B_{ABA}B_{ABA}$ pattern maximizes the chance that any pause of travel will result in doubt about what is inner, what is outer, and the doubt built into the design will be transferred, as guilt, to the entrant. This pattern has been found as graffiti all over the Mediterranean, suggesting that drawing it was a game.

proves that there is a mind–body cut, but not in the conventional way that this is regarded as a philosophical problem. It teaches that the mind and the body are what they are because of a cut, a rhetorical cut, and this cut is shown diagrammatically in the shape of the labyrinth typically used to describe the interval between the two deaths.

The design of this labyrinth is clever, although most commentators overlook its relation to the cut. Like the dream, the cut of the labyrinth is the active movement of the occupant, who can move only in two directions, in and out. Which is which is not always clear, since the folds of the labyrinth alternate between increased centripetal and centrifugal designs. This ABA design is fractal: $A_{ABA}B_{ABA}B_{ABA}$. At any point, the entrant may lose track of going in or out. A short pause, a quarter-turn to the walls on the left or right, or a 180° turn to look “back” can introduce doubt, especially when a smaller series of folds becomes larger. The only solution to confusion, Ariadne’s thread, given to help him escape after killing the Minotaur, proves that the in-out ambiguity is a problem and that the solution is to have something to pull on. The thread will have no tension on the “in” direction, only the “out.”

The fractal labyrinth relates to rhetoric in the sense that being well-spoken, i. e. having a command over the ambiguity of language’s cut between imposed literal content and the freedom of unspoken interpretations is also a cut, a cut structured by the $A_{ABA}B_{ABA}B_{ABA}$. This is the circularity of the “if ... then” situation, the self-referential statement such as made by the Cretan Liar. “All Cretans are liars,” spoken by a Cretan, is neither true nor false. It is a pure *cut* between the optional positions, “if true then false” and “if false then true.” The cut is the coincidence between the claim and the one who makes the

claim — again, the function of the unspoken prepositions, the “by whom” and “for whom.” The cut is made along the line of self-intersection and the result is non-orientation, the refusal of this claim to be resolved *literally*.

The rhetorical meaning of the Cretan Liar’s verbal labyrinth is like the structural alternation between in and out of the Thesean Labyrinth. The inside-out ambiguity *transfers* to the listener, the “traveler,” who now is made responsible — and who will feel *guilty if wrong* — for any error of getting lost. The labyrinth — the signifier in architectural form — cannot be guilty. How can it! It

is silent; it is making no claim! It is “just” a building. Guilt or innocence comes into the picture only when Theseus or another such traveler enters the labyrinth with the intention of reaching the center. Responsibility shifts to the traveler’s choices, the traveler’s doubt about those choices.¹⁴ It is likely, especially without Ariadne’s thread, that movement will be uncertain. The Other of desire, represented by the thread, will offer no tensile clue about the correctness of direction. The simplicity of the labyrinth (the fact that it is a meander and not a maze) streamlines the transfer of responsibility from the architecture to the entrant. The cut that is the labyrinth’s cut between inside and outside becomes entirely a function of the entrant’s discipline and ability to comprehend the shape of this building’s ambiguity.

The transfer of responsibility and the likelihood of failure explain why this figure, the universal emblem¹⁵ of the interval between the two deaths, is associated with guilt and depression, and why depression is a matter of the “well-spokenness” of rhetoric, as recognition of the cut. There are two voids in the labyrinth, just as there are two voids in well-spokenness. One void is in the articulated statement, its refusal to “close the circle” between the signifier and signified. The Cretan Liar is the classic case of this void, since the literal statement, “All Cretans are Liars,” refuses to close, refuses to be judged either true or false. This void continues to circulate between the positions of “if true then false” (TF) and “if false then true” (FT). This circulation pivots around a center lying outside this spiral, a center lying in a second void, which is the identity of the speaker, the Other of the statement. What does the speaker *want* of us, the listeners? What is his *desire*? Whose fault is it if the listener cannot respond appropriately to this rhetorical challenge? These questions lie outside of the tight spiral between TF and FT. They come from the second void, the one that can extend infinitely, an incontinent void. *Che vuoi?* What does the Other want us to do? What does this cut between TF and FT mean? The answer seems to lie in the Other’s desire, which remains a mystery to us.

The inner void of the Labyrinth, the tube-like meander, is, as Ariadne’s thread proves, held in tension. At one end is the Minotaur, the prisoner; at the other end is Theseus, who intends to kill the hybrid bull-man. This is in fact a war of the human subject not between a “human” and “animal” nature, but between a unified mind and a divided mind, a single-minded and therefore deluded mentality, and a “monstrous” mentality that embodies the doubt and guilt that Theseus will realize as soon as he stops to wonder which movement will take him inside, which outside. The true outer void of this tensile tube is the presence of the maker and the fact that the labyrinth is a *factum*, a space that is intended to create precisely this ambiguity. This outer void is the mind of the architect, Dædalus. Mind here is entirely topological in the sense that the playful

¹⁴ This point is often missed, even by Lacanian topologists intent on uncovering the labyrinth’s relation to psychoanalysis. See Mai Wegener, “Psychoanalysis and Topology — Four Vignettes,” in *Psychoanalysis: Topological Perspectives, New Conceptions of Geometry and Space in Freud and Lacan*, ed. Michael Friedman and Samo Tomšič (Bielefeld, DE: Transcript Verlag, 2016), 31–52.

¹⁵ W. F. Jackson Knight, *Cumaeae Gates. A Reference of the Sixth Aeneid to the Initiation Pattern* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1936). Jackson Knight documents cases in Malekula (New Hebrides) where the Thesean pattern duplicates the logic of the Mediterranean labyrinth.

combination of centrifugal and centripetal loops may or may not have been intentional, but the result implies an Other who masterfully has set up the puzzle with the intention of having the entrant, Theseus, succeed or fail. This is Lacan's definition of the topological torus, a spiral (non-orientable) cut around a perimeter, held into a circle (self-intersection). The 2-d aspect of the torus, which seems to be 3-d in every way, has to do with the way different cuts can be made on its surface. One cut, made by a plane tilted with respect to the torus's main axis, produces a *vesica pisces*, two circles that overlap to create the condition of "symmetrical difference." Elements lacking in one set are supplied by another set, which also lacks elements supplied by the first. This is the circularity of the Cretan Paradox, which in the *vesica* is described as "union without intersection." The lozenge shaped overlapping zone is the void, the TF>FT>TF spiral. It is a void that is continent in that the spiral never leaves the space constituted by paradox. But, this void itself rotates around a fixed center, the center that is incontinent, the Other of the rhetorical statement, "All Cretans are liars."

Although the Thesean labyrinth does not look like a torus, its logic is toroidal, explaining how this interval between the two deaths effects a transfer of guilt from the space itself to the occupant of the space. Proof of this point is ethnographic. Labyrinths (meanders) were employed by Catholic churches across Europe as a means for congregants to expiate guilt. The famous one at Chartres is for the express purpose of doing penance, its effectiveness based on the user's sudden awareness that he/she has been guilty of something previously unknown, and that only the labyrinth can expiate this guilt deriving from an unconscious transgression. This is a message that comes from the labyrinth's "empty center," its toroidal rather than geometric center, the center that creates an axis transmitting the desire of the Other to the supplicant bound by his/her own contained, offset-spiral concern.

Vico's Study Paradigm as a Case of Successive + Contemporaneous

Lacan's use of the cross, \perp in his "matheme" for the metaphor is controversial. Instead of the conventional meaning of the plus sign, +, he says that it signifies a "crossing of the bar," the — of the cross, by a vertical movement, |. The intention here, in this essay, is not to become involved in an intricate, obscure issue that would interest only Lacanians. Lacan's use of the \perp was intentional and revelational. It is about how metaphor actually works, how in crossing the bar (sign of the difference between the signifier and the signified) a meaning is suppressed while, at the same time, a *chain* of signifying relationships is set loose to map, as if it were a chain laid over a landscape, markers point both in the direction of the completion of meaning through the completion of the chain and in the direction of the *ground*, a field of reference points that exist both as a multiplicity and a unity. As a multiplicity they are (1) the mapping of the chain's progress in relation to travel, which can be across a landscape or over a work being analyzed, where the chain promises to "explain" the purpose of the journey and (2) a central point like that of the Other, a pivot holding the journey's gyre into a closed circuit. Like the labyrinth, the logic

of metaphor, indicated by the \perp , is toroidal. Crossing the bar, suppressing a signifier whose suppression becomes a focus and regulating pivot, and the simultaneity of the suppression with the expression of the horizontal chain is a compact way of saying that metaphor is the essence and structure of “the well-spoken,” the rhetorical face of the melancholic in the interval between the two deaths.

The melancholic’s guilt has been known since antiquity. In Aristotle’s “Problemata 30.1,” the philosopher lists the attributes of the melancholic: depression, suicidal anxiety, and uncertainty but also high intelligence, wit, and even genius. Melancholics seem to excel in the arts, Aristotle notes, either in spite of or because of their melancholy temperament. The melancholic’s emblem is the Thesean Labyrinth. The melancholic is in fact the subject who is permanently in the shadow of “between the two deaths.” How does the melancholic relate to the \perp ? The vertical element of suppression places the melancholic underground, along with the suppressed signifier. Both are suppressed, out of action, separated and alienated.

As the \perp suggests, a vertical attempt to establish definitive meaning is interrupted by a lateral movement, momentarily foreclosing the former but opening the latter to the possibility of a layered mapping. The single movement of signifiers, \rightarrow , becomes a double movement, \Rightarrow . How? This is the structure of metonymy, a kind of encoding by which one part of an object, idea, or action can serve to “count for” the whole. In one of the standard definitions of metonymy, saying “sail” instead of “ship,” the uppermost part of the sailing vessel replaces the other parts, as the part most useful. Useful *to* whom and *for* what, we should ask. The sail will be the first part seen when the ship sails from below the horizon into the view of *someone who wishes to count the number of ships*. Why would an observer wish to do this? If the ships are a part of a navy flotilla, the purpose might be to estimate the size of an impending attack, made by a scout with a telescope, reporting to the commander of an opposing navy. “Forty sails” tells the story, not just of the vertical structure of any single boat, but of how that boat will first appear to a distant observer, how it will be the basis of an inventory, and why an inventory is motivated, possibly, for military response.

Metonymy’s double structure is that it relates both to the “lateral organizations” of the physical components of the object and to the “vertical” or signifying relationships that we don’t know about, the “x” of the equation. As the first thing to be seen when the ships are advancing from beyond the horizon, the sail is an agent of surprise. We can imagine a look-out stationed in the bird’s nest of the commander’s ship, who must report any advance of an enemy force. An accurate count of the size of the force will be essential to effective response — whether to stay and fight or sail away in retreat. The metonymy is thus a kind of vagus nerve component, a means of making a quick judgement: seeing what the situation is in time to react.

Spatiality is implicit in this fight-or-flight judgment. How far away is the threat? How great? Is there *time* to get away, or must we stand and fight? If there is a wall between the attackers and

the defenders, we see the relation between the strength of the wall and the generic insulation value of space. A wall can protect against attackers who are directly below. If tall and thick enough, it will replace the insulation of distance and give the defenders time enough to prepare for their survival. Distance+wall > insulation or, in terms of metonymy, distance + wall > insulation, in that metonymy constitutes an early warning device. The small spiral around the tube of the torus already detects the distant effects of the torus's center, the incontinence (unlimited, unknown) strength of the enemy's force. Metonymy's small spiral is its linking nature, the fact that with every part of a signifier, new ways of connecting to other signifiers appear.




Figure 4. Freud's suppression of the name of the painter of the mural at Orvieto led to a series of metonymies, each of which contributed a part of the puzzle of the missing "Signorelli," a name that would seem to contain the element of the father, Herr, only for a foreigner, a stranger in a strange land. By definition a subject in motion (labyrinthine?) Freud found part-objects related to his forgetting, in effect mapping his loss across the Adriatic travel scene, with stories about a patient's suicide, polite Turks afraid of losing sex, and the coupling of BOsnia with HERzegovena.

We can see this clearly in the example of Freud's famous case of the "Signorelli Parapraxis." Brilliantly, Lacan discovered the trick behind Freud's famous Signorelli Parapraxis when he noticed that Freud noticed what the native speakers of Italian would not have noticed — the "signor" in Signorelli — and Freud would have found this paternal signifier, Herr, free for the taking. Only a stranger in a strange land would pick up this piece of fallen litter *à terre*, for just as in Lacan's formula for metaphor S replaces an S' (S/S', the + rule) but it has stolen the painting (mimesis) but left the frame (indication). The blank frame of the signifying chain points metaphorically downward, to the signified (S'...S'/x), the bar facilitate the sliding of metonymies, ..., while keeping the door to the signified shut: the — without the |. What happens later is that Freud continues on his trip, for is he not the kind of stranger in a strange land who is not running an errand but enjoying a vacation? Each time he tries to remember "Signorelli" he reaches for the wrong name: BOtticelli, BOltraffio Why? He later

speculates that this flotsam arrived from the wreck of Herzegovina and BOsnia, the lands of his Adriatic travels. Boltraffio turns and offers up another unused component, "–traffio," which becomes Traffei, the small town in Switzerland where, he hears, an old patient has just committed suicide out of distress over his loss of sexual function. Really? What a coincidence, since Freud now remembers conversations about Turkish patients, so polite that the always addressed their physicians as "Herr Doktor," and were notorious for preferring death to the loss of sex.

At each metonymy, something falls to the level of "x," a ground that we should not carelessly dismiss as a barroom floor. It will be swept, along with sawdust, but as Freud's diagram shows (Fig. 2), the place of repression is a recycling machine, an automaton working in concert with the

natural gravity of *tuchē* that makes every metonymy a dual, dropping to move, moving to drop. The swept floor will never be swept clean, but neither will anything that falls be lost. It will take Freud a few moments to realize the metaphoricity of his parapraxis, but it will take almost fifty years for Lacan to arrive with his formula of $S'...S'/x$. Like the Prisoners paralyzed by their Dilemma of frozen time, effective more than the walls that had enforced their statutory sentences, becomes the sentences of the $S'...S'$ that are ever more anchored by the missing “x” than by any signifier designated to be the last word, s”. In fact, Lacan points out that there will be no last word. Metaphor will construct a void surrounded by a lozenge-shaped apotrope, the “if true then false, if false then true.” This will certainly be a case where there is projective space without any obvious prop — no Möbius band, torus, or cross-cap — but certainly the ghosts of these figures will dominate the conversation as soon as we identify what, here, is non-oriented and what is self-intersecting.

The “knight’s move” logic of metonymy is evident in the way that any signifier has the option of turning either to the left or right after an initial direction has been chosen. Isn’t this in fact the logic of the labyrinth, where the chirality of the two walls holds the key to what’s inside and what’s outside? Metonymy is a signifier cut into “tangible” and a “latent” halves. The tangible can connect to another signifier, activating its own latent component. This now-active half can in turn energize the latent part of another signifier ... and on and on. As we see in Fig. 4, Freud’s sketch of the associations made on his Adriatic travels thanks to his inability to remember the name Signorelli, the web of associations made by these knight’s-move relations becomes a net cast over the travel landscape. The structure a figure that is “found” on the ground that begins, at the level of expression we could say, as a set of fracture lines, defining the figure as, at first, barely indistinguishable from its ground. As Freud’s memory tries to repair itself, this figure is pulled away from the ground, its profile becomes more distinct. The web or net is visible as such.

It is not just the recovery of the lost name that is the goal of this figure-ground distinction. It is the role of the cut — which we should accurately describe as a *katagraphic* or generative cut (a cut that simultaneously divides and joins) — in establishing the two voids of the torus or, in other words, connecting the roles of continence and incontinence, the spiral that fails to recall “Signorelli” and the larger gyre that holds the truth of Freud’s status as an outsider. Lacan would say that the former takes place entirely within the space of the Symbolic, the social, where Freud interacts with fellow-travelers, joking, conversing, sharing stories. The latter is about the alienation of the stranger in a strange land, the dislocation of the Austrian Jew in the Adriatic, where the ambiguity of hospitality (a contronym, since *hostes* means both hospitable and hostile) determines an uneasy balance. Fragility of ambiguity is the dynamic by which the two voids become existential. As interactive, Freud is a traveler like any other, completing circuits of social interaction, expected politeness, observance of local customs. This is the continent tube of the torus of travel, the one by which any traveler may “fit in” and be a mortal among other mortals on

behalf of mortality itself: equal as a human being, not differentiated as a stranger from some foreign land.

In relation to his forgetting, however, Freud has discovered the other, the remote and incontinent void, the one that curves his everyday circuit into another circuit, non-oriented and self-intersecting. Here distance doesn't matter, since the literal geographic terrain will be superimposed by the anxiety of Freud's suppression of the name Signorelli, which may unconsciously become the "name of the father," the super-ego Other, the enigmatic commander of the flotilla of the sailor who must report as early as possible the number of sails on the horizon. It is the commander who will decide to flee or fight, the Other who supplants the sailor's personal estimate of threat with a decision made on the basis of a cut, the cut of the sensorium that makes responses effective and efficient. Freud's sensorium is the everyday of his travel, which may be tranquilized locally with conversations, conventional behaviors, and obedience to local customs. There will be an anxiety, however, one with a vagus-nerve like trigger, the hovering enigma of the father, the Herr in Signorelli, the Father who will tell him, without giving reasons, to continue travelling or cut short his tour and retreat to the safety of home.

This long digression has aimed to get to the point of being able to hand over this puzzle to the reader, who must, for herself, decide how the \perp of suppression, followed immediately by a chain of metonymies that map an invisible plan across a passive, ignorant landscape, might relate to ethnology — how in fact this process tells the story of the primitive condition, the origins of human language, where suppression (paralysis) and expression (ritual divination) played entirely different and distinctive roles. Is the case of "cyclopean" society in any way related to Freud's parapraxis? Perhaps there are no particular details that give the slightest indication of this, but the structure of the \perp indicates a function of the "as soon as" connection between suppression and expression the sudden emergence of a "toroid" condition of two voids, one continent (ritual divination), the other incontinent ("Hades").

If the torus is a paradigm or model of the metaphoric structure of thought, it possibly draws the map for how this thought becomes simultaneously successive (the creation of three distinctive modes of thought, the expressive, representative, and conceptual) and simultaneous (the structure of any "moment" of an experience, a thought, or a wish). The \perp is what Vichian scholars themselves cannot seem to understand, and certainly what few outside of this branch of scholarship can conceptualize to the degree that Vico did, with the possible exception of Ernst Cassirer.

Solving this puzzle is not important. Being aware of it is paramount and indispensable to anyone who wishes to see architecture and narrativity as not just a + but a \perp . This is the Hamiltonian, the cosmic but scholarly principle brought down to earth by the Escher formation's construction of *locale*.

